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The relationship between sainthood and the sharifian monarchy in Morocco has 
attracted much attention from researchers within the area of Moroccan studies. The 
analysis of this relationship can offer invaluable insights into the dynamics of Moroccan 
history because the king and the saint are widely regarded as the two most salient actors 
in this history. Yet, the study of the relationship between these two figures has suffered a 
tendency towards downplaying its historically dynamic nature, and essentializing the 
cultural constructs upon which it is predicated.  
 In this thesis, I offer a revisionary reading of king/saint relationship through 
analyzing three examples from the ‘Alawite dynasty. I argue that this relationship has 
been highly dynamic, and has capitalized on baraka and sharifism as versatile cultural 
constructs. More significantly, the dynamics of king/saint relationship in Moroccan 
culture allows the strategic reinvention of history in order to meet the demands of 
changing historical contexts. 
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1Introduction: 
The relationship between the sharifian sultanate and the saintly institution in Morocco has 
attracted much attention from historians, anthropologists, and political scientists. 
Researchers have traditionally sought an explanation for the longevity of the world’s 
oldest potent monarchy1 in its relationship to a peculiarly Moroccan form of sainthood. 
Clifford Geertz, for example, has long read Moroccan history in terms of a static pattern 
of “strong man politics” and “holy man piety” whose heroes are the saint and the king. 
He writes: 
 that it was self-made warrior saints—hommes fetiches—as Bel again 
 so aptly calls them—who forged the uncreated conscience of Morocco, 
 indeed forged Morocco itself, is beyond much doubt.2
Geertz is referring here to the French colonial historian Alfred Bel whose La Religion 
Musulmane en Berberie (The Islamic Religion in Barbary) (1938) he regards as “the best 
book on the development of North-African Islam, and … one of the finest books ever 
written on the area.”3 Geertz includes in the category “hommes fetiches” the Moroccan 
king as well. He argues that “traditionally the Moroccan king has been in fact himself a 
homme fetiche, a man alive with charisma of both the hereditary and personal sort.”4
According to him then, both saint and king share in charisma, a term he uses in this 
context as equivalent to the Moroccan concept of baraka. Moreover, as hommes fetiches,
both possess, or at least work hard to possess, holy-man piety along with strong-man 
 
1 See M. E. Combs-Schilling, Sacred Performances: Islam, Sexuality, and Sacrifice (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989). 
2 Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1968), 26.  
3 Islam Observed, note p. 120. 
4 Islam Observed, 53. 
2politics. Thus conceived, these two figures serve to illustrate Geertz’s larger point about 
Moroccan Islam as scriptural in theory but anthropolatrous in fact.6
The image we get from reading Geertz on Morocco is that of a uniform Moroccan 
history with baraka as the monolith. Despite the rise and fall of different dynasties, the 
succession of various kings and distinct historical eras, saint and king, both hommes 
fetiches, continued their uniform struggle for the making of Moroccan history. A static 
baraka that meant essentially the same thing for everyone kept The dynamics of the 
process in motion. Geertz recounts a coherent story of a static culture.7
In this thesis, I argue that king/saint relationship in Morocco has been highly 
dynamic, and has followed different patterns in different historical contexts. The 
historical dynamism of this relationship and the creative ways in which both saint and 
king deployed the symbolic capital of a highly malleable baraka were the main factors 
behind the longevity of the Moroccan monarchy as well as the historical influence of the 
Moroccan saint. A static baraka could have allowed neither king nor saint to survive 
centuries of political change, nor could the relationship between saint and king have 
remained essentially the same under the exacting demands of different historical eras.  
 The concepts of baraka and sharifism are of crucial importance to my argument 
in this thesis. Traditionally conceived as cultural constants in Moroccan history, I argue 
that what is constant about them is their symbolic weight whereas their content and 
operation have been highly versatile. I invoke sharifism here not only because descent 
 
6 Islam Observed, 53. 
7 Geertz’s reductively coherent version of Moroccan history stands in striking contrast to his affirmation in 
After the Fact that ‘there is no general story to be told, or synoptic picture to be had, only a restless making 
and unmaking of facts and ideas’ when he contemplated his approach retrospectively. See his After the 
Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 
2. 
3from the prophet confers baraka and interferes with its operation, but also because I am 
interested in the relationship between the king and the saint within the context of the 
sharifian state. The examples I consider are all from the rule of the ‘Alawites—a sharifian 
dynasty that has been ruling Morocco since the seventeenth century.10 
The historically dynamic nature of king/saint relationship and the versatility of the 
symbolic capital they deployed contribute to the shaping of a field of multiple power 
relations as well as plural models of power. The examples I examine in this thesis are 
ultimately meant to demonstrate that the culture of power in Morocco is rich and 
complex. The saint and king cannot be subsumed in the figure of the “homme fetiche” 
who then becomes “the axial figure” of Moroccan history.11 
Before proceeding to analyze three examples of king/saint relationship, I 
introduce baraka and sharifism and outline their politics in general terms. I then examine 
the three examples which are drawn from different stages of the ‘Alawites’ rule. My first 
example comes from an early stage (late 17th century) when the rule of the ‘Alawites was 
being consolidated by the all-powerful Moulay Ismail. His historical encounter with 
Lyusi, which has been mythologized by popular imagination, serves as a classical 
example of the politics of baraka and sharifism and how these are played out by both 
saint and king. In this sense, this example provides a basic background against which the 
two other examples are read.  
The second example comes from a period of crisis for the sharifian king  (19th 
century) when external threats and internal dissent were about to bring the sharifian state 
to an end. In this example, I read Moulay Slimane’s letter against the saintly institution as 
 
10 It is worth mentioning that this is the same dynasty upon which Geertz focuses his analysis in Islam 
Observed, After the fact, and elsewhere. 
11 Geertz, Islam Observed, 8. 
4symptomatic of his anti-Berber political policy. I analyze how historical factors, as well 
as the characters of both king and saint, affect the relationship between these two figures, 
define baraka and sharifism, and determine the circulation of power. My third example, 
from contemporary Morocco, illustrates an almost opposite pattern of king/saint 
relationship. The sharifian king in this example writes a letter of support for the saintly 
institution as part of his larger policy of promoting Sufism as an alternative to Islamism 
in the post-9/11 global context. The three examples illustrate the historical dynamism of 
saint/king relationship and the versatility of the cultural determinants of this relationship; 
namely, baraka and sharifism. They also reveal the ongoing reimagining of Moroccan 
history via the dynamics of saint/king relationship. Nowhere is this process of 
reimagining better dramatized, however, than in king Mohamed the sixth's post-9/11 
religious politics where history is reinvented as an anti-terrorism strategy. 
My discussion of king/saint relationship presupposes the following points: 1- the 
saint and sharifian king are distinct but overlapping figures; they share in baraka and 
sharifism, but they access and deploy them differently, 2- personal baraka is the defining 
feature of the saint whereas sharifism and the hereditary baraka it confers are 
distinguishing features of the sharifian king, 3- although Sufism and sainthood 
correspond to distinct orders of religious and social experience, I use the two terms 
synonymously here because the distinction between the saint and the Sufi does not affect 
my argument,12 4- whenever I use the term “sharifian state,” I am not referring of course 
 
12 It is a slight and problematic distinction to make anyway.  
5to the Western model of state but, to use Darif’s terms, to “the ultimate stage in the 
development of the traditional Moroccan state.”13 
My study of the dynamics of king/saint relationship in Morocco is in a large part a 
comparative study of different historical contexts, and how these contexts are reinvented 
retrospectively. In the story of the confrontation between Moulay Ismail and Lyusi, 
which I draw from Geertz, history is the product of popular imagination. It, therefore, 
reflects the worldview of the Moroccan popular classes among whom Geertz conducted 
his fieldwork in Sefrou. In Moulay Slimane’s letter, on the other hand, history is filtered 
through the Wahhabi doctrine, and reproduced as a discourse aimed at de-legitimizing the 
Berber uprising against the king under the leadership of a “saint.”14 As for Mohamed the 
Sixth’s letter to the international Sufi conference, it is symptomatic of a post-9/11 
religious policy wherein history is spectacularly reinvented in order to fight against the 
spread of international terrorism into Morocco.  
By stressing the creative element in the making of a dynamic Moroccan history, 
this thesis is, in part, a critique of Geertz’s one-dimensional reading of this history. 
Despite his contributions to an interpretive theory of culture and an awareness of the role 
of representational dynamics in anthropology, Geertz has popularized an over-reductive 
version of Moroccan history where the homme fetiche, a term he borrowed from French 
colonial historian Alfred Bel, functions as the emblem of an essentially static culture. 
Moroccan history, according to Geertz, witnessed change only on the surface while the 
 
13 Mohamed Darif, Muassasat az-Zawaya bil-Maghreb (The Institution of the Zawaya in Morocco), Rabat, 
1992, 45 
14 I argue in the third section that Mhawesh, to whom I am referring here, underwent a metamorphosis 
during the Berber rebellion. The extent and nature of his involvement in this political campaign turned him 
into a military leader rather than a saint. I am therefore using the term saint with reservation here. 
6same patterns persisted deep in the social and political life of the country. Conversely, I 
argue that the apparently static patterns in fact camouflaged highly versatile dynamics. 
I approach the study of king/saint relationship with the assumption that history is 
in a large part textual. It lends itself to a representational economy that can be best 
decoded through careful textual analysis. I thus examine the texts of Geertz’s rendition of 
a popular story, Moulay Slimane’s letter against zawaya, and Mohamed the Sixth’s letter 
in support of Sufism as instances of the making and remaking of a cultural history. This 
history is imagined through a dynamic relationship between two figures who have come 
to be regarded as the two most salient actors in Moroccan history. My analysis of these 
examples draws upon history, anthropology, and rhetoric, and is informed to a large 
extent by the theoretical insights of New Historicism. 
Finally, a brief historical account of the early dynasties that ruled Morocco, the 
maraboutic crisis and the rise of the sharifian state is in order since it is crucial for 
understanding the dynamics of king/saint relationship in the sharifian state.  
In 788 A.D., Idriss Ben Abdallah al-Kamil—a descendent of the prophet 
Mohamed—arrived in Morocco after he had fled persecution at the hands of the Abbasid 
Caliph Haroun Ar-Rachid. A group of Berber tribes already fully converted to Islam by 
the earlier Arab arrivals welcomed him and proclaimed him king. The Moroccan royal 
tradition was thus launched by a sharif. Although it attained its own glory under the rule 
of Idriss II—the founder of the city of Fez—the Idrisside dynasty did not stay in power 
for long (788-1016). The age of the great Berber dynasties was soon to be launched.  
The heyday of Moroccan history corresponds to the rule of the three Berber 
dynasties that succeeded to the throne from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries: the 
7Almoravids (1061-1147), the Almohads (1130-1269), and the Merinides (1244-1398) 
corresponding to the three major Berber tribes Sanhaja, Masmoda, and Zenata. This was 
the so-called Khaldunian Morocco in reference to Ibn-Khaldun, the fourteenth-century 
North-African philosopher of history, who was inspired by the succession of the Berber 
tribes to analyze the key factors that contribute to political authority. Ibn-Khaldun 
identified three main factors of political authority: religious allegiance and fervor, group 
feelings (‘asabiyya), and a strong royal power. His analysis of the dynamics of group 
feelings is in fact a reading in the history of the great Berber dynasties.14 According to 
Ibn Khaldun, the consolidation of group feelings (‘asabiyya) contributes to the rise to a 
new civilization, and their subsequent diffusion into a more general civilization gives 
way for the rise of a new ‘asabiyya and ultimately a new civilization. 
After the demise of the Merinide dynasty at the end of the fourteenth century, 
Marabouts appeared on the political scene to compensate for the absence of a central 
government.15 This period spanned the entire fifteenth century and is generally referred to 
as the maraboutic crisis following the use of French colonial historians. The so-called 
maraboutic crisis finally came to an end towards the mid-sixteenth century thanks to Al-
Jazuli, the most prominent Sufi of Moroccan history.16 Al-Jazuli promoted a sharifian 
 
14 Ibn-Khaldun actually served in the court of the Merinide Sultan Abou ‘Inan. 
15 Scholars disagree in their interpretation of the maraboutic crisis. Geertz, for instance, reads in it a 
reflection of the strong-man dimension of the personality of the saint in his constant quest for political 
power. In contrast, Vincent Cornell writes: 
 Contrary to the assumptions of Alfred Bel and his followers, the leaders 
of the Jazuliyya did not see themselves as rivals for the throne but as religious 
guides and moral guardians, and they tended to support any claimant for power  
who agree with their agenda. 
Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), 
xxxix. 
16 Al-Jazuli founded the most influential, and most distinctively Moroccan, Sufi order in Moroccan history. 
He rose to mythical status after his death. For a detailed account of this historical figure as well as his 
tariqa Jazuliyya, refer to Vincent J. Cornell, Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998). 
8family from Southern Morocco that finally came to power in 1554 restoring the royal 
tradition, this time on the basis of sharifian descent from the prophet. The Saadians 
stayed in power for almost a century (1554-1660) before they gave way to another 
sharifian dynasty—the ‘Alawites—who capitalized upon their sharifian origin most 
effectively. The ‘Alawites have been ruling Morocco since mid-seventeenth century, they 
have thus stayed in power longer than any other dynasty in Moroccan history. For most 
researchers, the ‘Alawite dynasty is the sharifian state par excellence whereas the 
Saadians represented just a first step towards the foundation of the true sharifian state. 
 
I- Introducing baraka and sharifism: 
Baraka and sharifism are the most salient variables that determine the dynamics of the 
relationship between the sharifian king and the saint in Morocco. For those who gloss 
over the two terms, baraka is simply charisma, spiritual power or divine blessing, and 
sharifism is descent from the prophet Mohamed. These terms, however, are much more 
complex. While the symbolic capital of baraka and sharifism has remained potent 
throughout Moroccan history, the content of this capital has been highly versatile. It 
varied according to the social and historical realities in the context of which baraka and 
sharifism were played out, as well as the character of both saint and king. In this section, 
I introduce baraka and sharifism insofar as they affect the relationship between the saint 
and the sharifian king. 
 In an oft-quoted passage from Islam Observed, Geertz defines baraka as follows: 
 Literally, “Baraka” means blessing, in the sense of divine favor, but 
 spreading out from that nuclear meaning, specifying and delimiting it, 
 it encloses a whole range of linked ideas: material prosperity, physical 
 
9well-being, bodily satisfaction, completion, luck, plenitude (...) In broadest 
terms, “baraka” is not as it has so often been represented, a paraphysical 
force, a kind of spiritual electricity—a view which though not entirely 
without basis, simplifies it beyond recognition. Like the notion of the 
exemplary center, it is a conception of the mode in which the divine 
reaches into the world. Implicit, uncriticized, and far more systematic, it 
too is a “doctrine” (...) More exactly, it is a mode of construing—
emotionally, morally, intellectually—human experience, a cultural gloss 
on  life. And though this is a vast and intricate problem, what this 
construction, this gloss, comes down to, so at least it seems to me, is the 
proposition (again of course wholly tacit) that the sacred appears most 
directly in the world as an endowment–a talent and a capacity, a special 
ability–of particular individuals. Rather than electricity, the best (but still 
not very good) analogue for baraka is personal presence, force of 
character, moral vividness. Marabouts have Baraka in the way men have 
strength, courage, dignity, skill, beauty, or intelligence. Like these, though 
it is not the same as these, more even of all of them put together, it is a gift 
which some men have in greater degree than others, and which a few, 
marabouts, have in superlative degree. The problem is to decide who (not 
only among ... the living but also among the dead) has it, how much, and 
how to benefit from it.1
Geertz’s definition takes note of the ubiquity of baraka and the variety of its 
manifestations in Moroccan society. More importantly, it seeks out the logic that explains 
this ubiquity, governs and unites these manifestations. Geertz compares baraka to the 
exemplary center and proposes that it is essentially a conception, more particularly, the 
Moroccan cultural conception, of the relationship between the divine and the worldly, the 
spiritual and the material.  The notion of baraka as an exemplary center that models the 
way the divine reaches into this world, in the form of an endowment or a gift, is alluring. 
In fact, bringing the divine and the worldly together is a leitmotif of most manifestations 
of baraka in Moroccan society. It is, however, how and why, beyond the religious 
perspective, these are brought together which escapes Geertz’s analysis and which I 
propose to analyze in this thesis as a highly dynamic process. 
 
1 Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed, 44. 
10
Geertz’s interpretation of baraka is of little help in understanding much of the 
religio-political history of Morocco. Indeed, it proved counter-productive in Geertz’s 
largely one-dimensional reading of Moroccan history in terms of holy-man piety and 
strong-man politics. According to Geertz, the Moroccan king is basically a venerated, 
baraka-endowed saint, and the saint a contestant for political power. Governing the 
relationship between king and saint, as well as the whole social fabric in Morocco, 
according to Geertz, is the politics of patronage and gift exchange.  Contrary to Geertz, I 
read baraka as a historically dynamic social force instead of an inherently static cultural 
conception. It is a force that owes its constancy and potency to its versatility.  
The versatile content and dynamic operation of Moroccan baraka allows it to 
reside in a number of agents. Many Moroccans believe not only in the parents’ and the 
children’s baraka, but also in the baraka of shared food. Yet, it is the saint, as Geertz 
notes, who is the prime possessor of baraka in Moroccan society. Indeed, baraka 
catalyzes ascent to the status of sainthood in this society. However, what differentiates 
the baraka of the saint and that of the others is not, as Geertz suggests, how much baraka 
each of them possesses. The quantitative approach is counter-productive in this context. 
There is no certain means for quantifying baraka, but there is a certain means for 
qualifying it through appraising its intervention in the everyday world.  
 Westermarck observed in his Ritual and Belief in Morocco that popular piety 
accorded greater value to saints’ shrines than to mosques. This claim was true of popular 
piety until very recent times. The Moroccan layman, however, did not accord greater 
value to the saint’s shrine because s/he believed that more baraka lied in the shrine than 
11
in the mosque. This would have been too unorthodox a belief to be held by the saints’ 
adepts who are very careful to identify their belief in the saints with juridical Islam. 
The laymen accord more value to the saint’s baraka because it is more practically 
useful for their everyday life. The baraka of the mosque and the other symbols of 
juridical Islam is rather distant from the illiterate masses who need a more accessible 
form of faith. The saint claims, or at least is supposed, to be able to intervene in their 
daily life and to act on the world through his (rarely her) “miracles”2 for their sake. 
Juridical Islam, on the other hand, asks them to be patient and to look forward to the 
other world. It also talks to them on a higher intellectual level than the saint does. The 
baraka of the saint is more accessible, therefore more valuable to them despite their 
ultimate faith in the baraka of the symbols of juridical Islam.3
Similarly, the baraka of the sharifian king is distinct from that of the saint due to 
its function and manifestations. The king does not perform miracles, but he is responsible 
for the welfare of the country which he has to defend against foreign enemies and internal 
 
2 I am using the word “miracle” with reservation here because the accurate term for the description of the 
uncanny act performed by the saint is karama (pl. karamat) rather than miracle (Ar. Mu‘jiza) which refers 
in the Islamic tradition to the prophets’ feats.  Karama, however, is untranslatable, and it has generally 
gone unnoticed by anthropologists who use the word miracle indistinctly instead.  
3 There is a large literature on the Moroccan saint as mediator between juridical Islam and the popular 
Islam of the illiterate masses. A classical study of this mediating role is Ernest Gellner’s Saints of the Atlas 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). In Moroccan Islam, Dale Eickelman quotes one of his 
informants on this issue, and hence presents us with a telling example of the popular perspective: 
[J]ust as the king has his ministers, God has his [marabouts]. If  
 you need a paper from the government office, which is better? Do  
 you go straight to the official and ask for it? You might wait a long 
 time and never receive it. Or do you go to someone who knows you 
 and also knows the official? Of course, you go to the friend, who presents  
 the case to the official. Same thing with baraka, if you want something  
 from God, you go to [the marabout]. He is just like us. The only difference 
 is that he works with God [khdem m‘a Allah] and has a high rank 
 [daraja kbira] with him. If the marabout is too great [to directly 
 approach], you go to his children.   
Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), 
161. 
12
strife (Ar. fitna).4 Most of the time, the king’s baraka meant the display of sheer military 
power against recalcitrant tribes in the form of harkat,5 as well as the suppression of 
individual rebels to ensure the integrity of the country.6 The king’s baraka is therefore 
synonymous with military success. The saint, on the other hand, lacks military power and 
relies mainly upon his spiritual influence. Yet, he carves out for himself a social role by 
converting his spiritual capital into an interventionist miraculous power. He also turns his 
lack of military power into an asset that allows him to take side with the people and 
advocate their cause before the Makhzen. The Moroccan saint is a mediator not only 
between God and the laymen, but also between the king and the people. 
The sharifian king’s baraka, however, has a spiritual aspect to it as well. The king 
tempers the show of force by promoting an ideology that is centered around his person as 
a descendent of the prophet.7 Unlike the saint who, in most cases, acquires his baraka 
through apprenticeship,8 the sharifian king has inherited his baraka genealogically. 
Hence, his baraka is distinct from that of the saint by virtue of its origin as well. The 
sharifian king makes use of a number of symbols and rituals to assert his religious 
 
4 Fitna is a highly poignant concept in the Islamic tradition. Its semantic field is so wide and ranges from 
female beauty to internal political strife. Generally speaking though, it refers to all that can distract the 
Muslim community from pursuing its highest aims, bring about its disunity and thus weaken it. The 
traditional saying goes that “fitna is worse than killing.” Preventing fitna is, therefore, the prime duty of a 
Muslim ruler. Throughout the history of the Islamic civilization, however, Islamic rulers have adopted 
widely differing measures to “strike the causes of fitna.” While some have adopted excessively pacifist 
policies in order to avoid internal strife in the Muslim community, others have used the prevention of fitna 
as an alibi to suppress all forms of opposition. 
5 Harkat is the plural form of harka which refers to a military expedition organized by the sultan for 
punitive or fiscal purposes. 
6Refer to Raymond Jamous, Honneur et Baraka: Les Structures Sociales Traditionelles dans le Rif (Paris: 
Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1981), 228, and Darif, Muassasat, 124. 
7 See Darif, 45. 
8 For a detailed account of the stages that the baraka seeker (Ar. murid) goes through as an apprentice to a 
sufi sheikh, refer to Abdellah Hammoudi, “The Reinvention of Dar al-mulk: The Moroccan Political 
System and its Legitimation,” in Rahma Bourquia &Susan Gilson Miller (eds.), In the Shadow of the 
Sultan: Culture, Power and Politics in Morocco (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) 129-175. 
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authority, consolidate faith in his sharifian baraka, and indirectly legitimize his temporal 
power.9
In popular imagination, the moral grace of the sharifian king’s baraka is 
responsible for blessing the inhabitants of his dominion with good crop and health. 
Furthermore, the king has to answer for his title as “prince of the faithful” by promoting 
religiosity and overseeing that the Islamic tradition thrives in the abode of Islam. The 
Moroccan sultan has long considered himself the caliph of Western Islamdom.10 A strong 
government11 and a well-faring, religiously observant society are signs of the strong 
baraka of the king and the benediction of God.  Mohamed Dernouni sums up the popular 
conception of the king’s baraka in the following passage: 
Every king is said to be a depository of baraka … These beliefs have it 
also that the king who possesses a strong baraka … is alone capable of 
granting his people abundant crop and progeny. Conversely, the 
deterioration or loss of baraka on the part of the prince results in trouble, 
uprisings, and famine linked to drought.12 
Baraka is an inconstant power, then, in the sense that it can diminish, lose its 
effectiveness, or even turn into its opposite if the conditions of its operation are not 
maintained. The king was especially unfortunate for having a far more difficult task of 
 
9 For ritual and symbolism as legitimizing strategies, refer to M.E. Combs-Schilling, Sacred Performances: 
Islam, Sexuality, and Sacrifice, and Mohamed Kably, “Legitimacy of State Power and Socioreligious 
variations in Medieval Morocco,” in In the Shadow of the Sultan, 17-29, respectively. 
10 Refer to Mohamed Kably, “Legitimacy of State Power and Socioreligious variations in Medieval 
Morocco,” and Driss Ksikes, “Les Chorfa Menent la Danse,” Tel Quel, No. 165, March 2005. 
<http://www.telquel-online.com/165/couverture_165_1.shtml>
It is worth mentioning that by the time the ‘Alawite dynasty rose to power in Morocco, the latter was the 
only Muslim country outside the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire. 
11 Makhzen is the traditional name of the Moroccan central government. Moroccans still use this term 
occasionally nowadays. 
12 Mohamed Dernouni, “Croyances et representations de la naissance en milieu Marocain d’hier et 
d’aujourd’hui,” in Enfances Maghrebines (Casablanca: Afrique Orient, 1987) 17. My translation. 
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preserving his Baraka than the saint had. He had to maintain the territorial integrity of a 
country that was object to the expansionist aspirations of both the Europeans to the North 
and the Ottomans to the East. He also had to keep the recalcitrant Berber tribes in control 
in order to avoid fitna, and to secure social welfare in a country that was frequently 
inflicted with both plague and drought.13 Conversely, the saint had an easier task 
maintaining the prosperity of his descendents, lodge and community, and curing the sick, 
especially the demon-possessed, within this community. Moreover, even when he is 
unable to maintain these favorable conditions, he can usually blame their deterioration 
upon the king. Epidemics, for example, were usually blamed upon the decadence of the 
ruler and the corruption of the society he misrules. Ironically, the baraka of the king turns 
in this situation to its opposite—bas.14 While it would seem that the inherited baraka of 
the sharifian king in whose veins runs the blood of the prophet is more resistant, indeed 
infallible, it in fact proves to be more prone to deterioration. This is the case not only 
because of the aforementioned reasons but also because sharifism itself has spread out 
from its primary genealogical denotation to become a legitimizing ideology. 
 Paul Rabinow remarks that “genealogical manipulation is a standard practice in 
Morocco.”15 Indeed, there are still Moroccan families today who go to great lengths in 
order to prove, or altogether fabricate, a sharifian genealogy.16 Sharifism has waxed and 
 
13 For a brief account of how bubonic plague and drought changed the course of Moroccan history, refer to 
Combs-Schilling’s Sacred Performances, especially the chapter entitled “Historical Success and Crisis.” 
14 In fact, one can tenably argue that bas is not the opposite of baraka, and that it is just another aspect of it 
that escaped Geertz’s, and other anthropologists’, notice. In Moroccan cultural imagination, baraka is 
coincident with the moral force of virtue against evil. In this sense, it is an agency of blessing and reward as 
well as curse and retribution.  
15 Paul Rabinow, Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 
52. 
16 For a description of the elaborate administrative process involved in obtaining an official certification of 
sharifian origin, as well as the privileges that accrue to families who manage to obtain such certification, 
see Driss Ksikes, “Les Chorfa Menent la Danse.” Traditionally, the palace itself was involved in verifying 
15
waned with the succession of the different dynasties that ruled Morocco since 788, the 
year Idriss I arrived in Morocco and launched the rule of its first dynasty. The symbolic 
weight of sharifism, however, has accumulated throughout and reached its climax in the 
sixteenth century when a Sufi master promoted descent from the prophet as a political 
ideology in order to pull the country out of the moral uncertainties, and political turmoil 
of the maraboutic crisis.17 
However, this symbolic capital was not the only aspect of sharifism on which the 
‘Alawite kings capitalized. Moroccan political sociologist Mohamed Darif suggests that, 
as a post-maraboutic-crisis political ideology, sharifism solved one of the thorniest 
problems in Moroccan history; namely, the conflict between the Islamic/Arab and the 
Berber conceptions of government. The Islamic conception of government, which came 
to be identified by Berbers as the Arab conception, relies on the religious bond of the 
Islamic community, whereas the Berber conception relies upon the bond of kinship 
within the context of the tribe. Darif explains that 
 in fact, the sharifian state (…) embodies a suitable solution to the 
 conflict between the Islamic and Berber conceptions of government. 
It is a solution whereby the “bond of blood” is transposed from  
the “people” to the person of the sultan. In simple terms, “sharifism” 
 is the sought “synthesis.”18 
The sharifian king, then, rules by virtue of his blood descent from the prophet, and his 
title as prince of the faithful and protector of the creed. From the Berber conception 
 
sharifian origin especially when the family seeking the certification claims  a ‘Alawite origin. Ksikes’s 
article throws light also upon the symbolic weight of sharifism in contemporary Moroccan society. 
17 Refer to the introduction. 
18 Darif, Muassast, 49. My translation. Darif’s view here is informed by Andre Adam’s “Reflexions sur le 
fait berbere au Maghreb, hier et aujourd’hui,” Mondes et Cultures, Tome XIII, 2-5 (1982). 
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sharifism retained the bond of blood as a principle of government and merged it with the 
Islamic conception to create a distinctly Moroccan form of government.  
 What was left out of the Berber conception, however, was the tribe, a landmark of 
Berber cultural and political identity prior to the rise of the sharifian state. Throughout a 
significant part of its history, Morocco was divided into the so-called bled s-siba and bled 
al-makkzen, the former referring to the recalcitrant Berber tribes, and the latter to central 
government. By superseding the tribe and the Berber/Arab opposition in the name of a 
Muslim community ruled by a blood descendent of the prophet, the sharifian king aspired 
to the exclusive manipulation of power. 19 
Nevertheless, the tribes responded through their local saints who claimed 
sharifian origin and thus contested the sharifian king’s authority. Claiming sharifian 
descent became a common practice among Moroccan saints who aspired to consolidate 
their personally acquired baraka through the additional capital of sharifism. Geertz 
observes in a rather sarcastic tone that 
 [h]e who had attained any great amount of baraka from his own 
spiritual efforts—chanting verses or licking hot pokers—tended  
almost always to claim to have it also, so to speak, genetically.20 
19 I am not implying here that s-siba ended with the rise of the sharifian state. Indeed, the sharifian king had 
to organize frequent harkat against the Atlas tribes to assert his authority over them and keep them in 
control. Yet, s-siba had a symbolic setback after the maraboutic crisis. It is worth mentioning that the 
concept of s-siba is still active in the cultural memory of Moroccans who use it frequently to refer to any 
state of disorder or lack of security. 
S-siba is discussed in almost all works about Moroccan history. It is magnified in French colonial 
scholarship as well as the works that are inspired by this scholarship (Geertz’s included), and revisioned in 
contemporary Moroccan scholarship. For a classical study of s-siba as an organized form of political 
dissension rather then anarchy, refer to Gellner’s Saints of the Atlas.
20 Islam Observed, 52. 
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Paradoxically enough, even Berber saints like Lyusi claimed that they were descendents 
of the prophet Mohamed. I will examine Lyusi’s claim to sharifism in the following 
section. 
 The sharifian king’s authority was also contested by urban saints, especially those 
belonging to prestigious sharifian families like the Idrissides. On the eve of the French 
protectorate, in 1908, Mohamed Benabdelkebir Kettani, an Idrisside sharif and head of 
the prestigious Kettani order in Fez, pushed the notables of Fez to sign a proclamation of 
the decadence of sultan Moulay Abdelaziz. This incident resulted in the first case of 
torture and death due to political opposition in modern Morocco.21 The Wazzani sharif 
and head of the Wazzani zawiya in the North, on the other hand, sought French 
protection as early as late nineteenth century in an unprecedented act of defiance of the 
king’s political authority.  Not only did the French grant him their protection, but they 
also contemplated enthroning him.22 The French were aware that the strong baraka 
reservoir of the Wazzani sharif, together with his uncontested sharifian descent, made 
him an ideal candidate for the Moroccan throne.23 
If baraka then is a power, sharifism is what best legitimizes power in Moroccan 
society. Yet, however distinct baraka and sharifism might be at the theoretical level, they 
actually overlap. Sharifism confers baraka, and the possession of baraka warrants claims 
to sharifism. Neither of the two, however, not even both of them, guarantee that a certain 
 
21 Refer to Ksikes, “Les Chorfa Menent la Danse.” 
22 See Ksikes, “Les Chorfa.” 
23 The Wazzani sharif Moulay Abdessalam kept cordial relationships with European powers. Ironically, he 
married a young British woman and thus set a precedent in his family as well as Morocco. While Islam 
does not ban the marriage of Muslim men from Christian women, it was outrageous that a sharif should 
marry a Christian woman and even allow her to retain her original faith. Generally speaking, he had a far 
more liberal character than the typical sharif, and he was apparently fascinated by Western culture. He 
capitalized, though, on his sharifian descent and his inherited baraka. For an account of the life of this 
sharif and the sphere of influence of his zawiya, refer to Emily Keene, My Life Story (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1911).  
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Moroccan would be either king or saint. It is how one deploys them and puts them to use 
in specific historical conditions that raises one to the status of either king or saint.  
 Baraka and sharifism are best read, at least for the purpose of analyzing the 
relationship between saint and king, as highly malleable concepts that have a constant 
symbolic capital in Moroccan history, but whose content and operation are highly 
versatile. The content and operation of baraka and sharifism are negotiated among king, 
saint, and the historical conditions which offer a range of possibilities that the saint and 
king must exploit. 
 
II- Moulay Ismail and Lyusi: The politics of baraka and sharifism  
 
Moulay Ismail is the second king of the ‘Alawite dynasty. He reigned for fifty-five years 
(1672-1727) during which he unified the country and consolidated the rule of the 
‘Alawites. It is often reported that during his reign a woman or a Jew could travel alone 
from the farthest south of the country to its farthest north without being in fear about 
his/her safety. While this is obviously an exaggeration, it still is a good metaphor of the 
unprecedented degree of order and security that Moulay Ismail’s iron fist achieved for the 
country. Moulay Ismail is also remembered for his imperial city—Meknes—which he 
filled with monuments. The most remembered detail about these monuments is the fact 
that Moulay Ismail was using Christian captives, among others, to build them, and that he 
treated these workers cruelly. If a worker slowed down or fell ill during construction, he 
was sealed into the wall on which he was working. So at least go the Moroccan popular 
memory of Moulay Ismail, as well as Western accounts of his rule. Perhaps, the huge 
underground prison that Moulay Ismail built in his imperial city, and that still stands as a 
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witness of the harshness of his rule, exacerbates these memories and contributes to his 
mythologization.   
 Sidi Lahsen Lyusi, on the other hand, is a Berber although popular imagination 
depicts him as a descendent of the prophet by way of Idriss II. He was born in a tribe in 
the Middle Atlas Mountains in 1631. He left his tribe at a young age for a lifelong 
pilgrimage that brought him first to Tamgrut—home of the Tariqa Nasiriyya. At 
Tamgrut, he received baraka from sheikh ben Nasir.1 Lyusi’s pilgrimage took him also to 
the intellectual centers of Morocco where he acquired knowledge of fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence).2 He died in 1691, and was buried in a village that now bears his name. 
Pilgrims still visit his darih (tomb) to benefit from his baraka.
Abdelfattah Kilito notes that “Al-Yusi’s relation to Mawlay Isma‘il is essentially 
epistolary.”3 Indeed, epistolary correspondence is characteristic of the relationship 
between kings and those scholars and saints who resist patronization by the palace. Kilito 
suggests that writing establishes a temporal and spatial distance that is convenient for 
both parties. It allows an open exchange of blame and advice while avoiding, or at least 
deferring, confrontation. In the case of Lyusi and Moulay Ismail, the surviving epistles 
which Lyusi addressed to Moulay Ismail attest to the fact that the king actually sought the 
 
1 When he arrived at Tamgrut, Lyusi found the sheikh seriously ill. The sheikh’s disciples refused to wash 
his shirt because they were disgusted by its, as well as the sheikh’s, appearance. Lyusi, however, did wash 
the shirt, and even drank the foul water thus produced. Lyusi’s eyes grew aflame as a sign that he now had 
baraka. For this story, see Geertz, Islam Observed. For a detailed and insightful analysis of baraka 
transmission through foul body waste, refer to Vincent Crapanzano, The Hamadsha: A Study in Moroccan 
Ethnopsychiatry (Berkeley: University of California, 1973). It has to be remembered that the baraka thus 
transmitted is personal, miraculous baraka.
2 Knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence was not a defining feature of Sainthood in Morocco. The  ‘alim and 
saint are distinct figures. Yet, Moroccan history abounds in examples of persons who embodied the fusion 
of the two figures. Most of the time, these saints/‘alims were urban figures. 
3 Abdelfattah Kilito, “Speaking to Princes: Al-Yusi and Mawlay Isma‘il”, trans. Michael Cooperson, in In 
the Shadow of the Sultan, 30-46. 
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advice of the saint/scholar  on both temporal and religious issues, while the saint/scholar 
provided the sought advice with much tactfulness.  
In his writings, Lyusi blames those religious scholars who are corrupted by power 
to become subservient to kings. He sees it incumbent upon religious scholars to blame 
kings for their misdeeds and injustice with the ultimate aim of correcting their characters, 
and elevating them morally. Yet, he insists that this duty should be carried out only when 
there is enough assurance that advice to the king would not cause fitna in society.4 As I 
previously mentioned, fitna is the evil that is most feared in the Islamic tradition for it is 
held accountable for many other social and political evils. To maximize the chance that 
the king would listen to the scholar’s advice with an open heart, and to prevent anyone 
from using this advice as a pretext to rise against the king and cause civil unrest, Lyusi 
employs rhetorical features such as propitiatory formulas, praise of the king, prayers on 
his behalf, and protestations of submission and fidelity.5
There was, however, an actual confrontation between Lyusi and sultan Moulay 
Ismail, one in which the lines between history and legend grow completely blurred 
through centuries of oral reproduction. The story of the confrontation especially  
multiplied in the popular imagination because its two protagonists were a wonder-
working saint and an immensely potent king. I recount this story from Geertz who 
reconstructs it from his informants’ renderings. Geertz insightfully comments that what 
these informants “lack in historical accuracy they more than make up for in cultural 
penetration.”6 Indeed, despite some extraordinary details like the legs of Moulay Ismail’s 
horse sinking into the ground under the effect of Lyusi’s baraka, the popular rendering of 
 
4 Refer to Kilito, “Speaking to Princes.”  
5 Refer to Kilito’s “speaking to princes.” 
6 Islam Observed, 32. 
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the story of the confrontation is poignant with cultural significance. It is an especially 
good illustration of the dynamics of miraculous and genealogical baraka examined in the 
previous section. In this regard, it is important to note that the additions of popular 
imagination to the story are not mere fictionalizing exercises. They rather embody a 
cultural conception of the relationship between king and saint, and dramatize the politics 
of baraka and sharifism in Morocco. 
Geertz reconstructs the story of the confrontation as follows: 
When Lyusi (…) arrived in Meknes, Mulay Ismail received him as an 
honored guest, fed him and housed him, and brought him into his court as 
his spiritual advisor. The Sultan was at the time building a large wall 
around the city, and the people working on it, slaves and others were being 
treated cruelly. One day a man fell ill while working and was sealed into 
the wall where he fell. Some of the workers came secretly to Lyusi to tell 
him of this and to complain of their treatment generally. Lyusi said 
nothing to Mulay Ismail, but when his supper was brought to his chambers 
he proceeded to break all the dishes, one by one, and he continued to do 
this, night after night, until all the dishes in the palace had been destroyed. 
When the sultan then asked what had happened to all his dishes, the palace 
slaves said, “that man who is our guest breaks them when we bring his 
food.” (…) The Sultan ordered Lyusi to be brought to him: 
“Salam ‘Alaikum.”
“ ‘Alaikum Salam.”
“My Lord, we have been treating you like the guest of God, and you have 
been breaking all our dishes.” 
“Well, which is better—the pottery of Allah or the pottery of clay?” (…) 
and he proceeded to upbraid Mulay Ismail for his treatment of the workers 
who were building his wall.(…) The Sultan was unimpressed and said to 
Lyusi, “All I know is that I took you in, gave you hospitality [a deeply 
meaningful act in Morocco], and you have caused me all this trouble. You 
must leave my city.” Lyusi left the palace and pitched his tent in the 
graveyard just outside the city near where the wall was being built. When 
the Sultan heard of this he sent a messenger to the saint to ask why, since 
he had been told to leave his, the sultan’s city, he had not in fact done so. 
“Tell him,” Lyusi said, “I have left your city and I have entered God’s.”  
Hearing this, the Sultan was enraged and came riding out himself on his 
horse to the graveyard where he found the saint praying. Interrupting him, 
a sacrilege in itself, he called out to him, “Why have you not left my city 
as I ordered?” And Lyusi replied, “I went out of your city and am in the 
city of God, the Great and the Holy.” Now wild with fury, the Sultan 
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advanced to attack the saint and kill him. But Lyusi took his lance and 
drew a line on the ground, and when the sultan rode across it the legs of 
his horse began to sink slowly into the earth. Frightened, Mulay Ismail 
began to plead to God, and he said to Lyusi, “God has reformed me! God 
has reformed me! I am sorry! Give me pardon!” The saint then said, “I 
don’t ask for wealth or office, I only ask that you give me a royal decree 
acknowledging the fact that I am a sheriff, and that I am a descendent of 
the Prophet and entitled to the appropriate honors, privileges, and respect.” 
The Sultan did this.8
In this story, we come across a powerful and unyielding Moulay Ismail. He is extremely 
cruel in his treatment of workers and slaves. He is, nonetheless, clearly interested in 
securing Lyusi’s friendship and support. He hosts him as a special guest and even brings 
him into his court as a spiritual advisor. However, once Lyusi expresses his discontent 
with the sultan’s treatment of his workers, Moulay Ismail displays an unyielding and 
impatient character. Not only does he refuse to listen to Lyusi but he goes as far as 
ordering him out of the imperial city. Later on, when Lyusi pitches his tent just outside 
the city and thus reveals his own unyielding resistance to the sultan’s will, Moulay Ismail 
impatiently and blasphemously interrupts his prayer and addresses him without the due 
form of greeting. Before an obstinate Lyusi, he resorts to sheer force and advances in 
person to attack the saint. This proves to be a losing move that betrays a lack of acumen 
on the part of Moulay Ismail who ends up by yielding to the saint’s miraculous baraka.
Lyusi, on the other hand, displays so much acumen, intelligence, patience, 
firmness, and self-confidence. He also deploys infallible tact in dealing with Moulay 
Ismail. He does not start by blaming or upbraiding him openly. He rather devises the 
course of his action in such a way that he would indirectly lead the sultan to recognize his 
 
8 Islam Observed, 33-35. An important feature of Geertz’s English rendition of the story is that he preserves 
the spirit of Moroccan Arabic by reproducing Moroccan idiomatic expressions, such as “the guest of God,” 
in his text. 
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own injustice. The force of his logic and metaphor, nevertheless, fails to overwhelm a 
stubborn Moulay Ismail. Finally, and in the face of the open display of force on the part 
of the Sultan, the saint falls back upon the miraculous workings of his baraka. The legs 
of Moulay Ismail’s horse start sinking into the earth, and we are left with the impression 
that had he not realized the grossness of his behavior and apologized in due time, the 
horse would have continued sinking down until Moulay Ismail himself is buried in earth. 
 The story illustrates the traditional distribution of baraka in Morocco. The king’s 
baraka manifests itself primarily through the use of force whereas the saint’s is displayed 
through the performance of miracles. This distribution, however, is not rigid. The two 
manifestations of baraka overlap. Popular imagination, for example, endows the saint 
with a lance that appears mysteriously in the final scene. The saint now possesses a 
weapon that he can use to defend himself against the sultan’s assault. Symbolically, 
however, the lance turns out to be a tool in the hands of personal baraka. Lyusi uses it to 
perform a miracle rather than to display physical power. With the lance, he draws a line 
on the ground dividing his and the sultan’s domains. The sultan’s horse starts sinking 
only when it has crossed the line and trespassed the saint’s domain which corresponds in 
the story to the domain of the divine (God’s city). Significantly, only a miracle could 
overwhelm Moulay Ismail’s pride and impatience. He finally repents and addresses 
himself to God and Lyusi at almost the same time. He pleads to God and asks Lyusi for 
pardon while repeating, “God has reformed me.” It is clearly implied in Moulay Ismail’s 
reaction that he has come to consider Lyusi as an instrument of God’s will.9 God has 
reformed him through Lyusi whose personal baraka becomes an instrument for the 
 
9 It is significant that in Moroccan Arabic a typical addition to the expression “God has reformed me” in 
such a context is “on your hand.” 
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intervention of the divine in the temporal world in order to set it right. Ever fascinated 
with the extraordinary interventions of saints to set things right in this world, popular 
imagination understandably grants final victory to Lyusi. 
 Popular imagination aside, the typical Moroccan saint is a socially committed 
figure. He is so much preoccupied with the welfare of the people that he often finds 
himself advocating their cause before the king with whom he consequently had frequent 
confrontations.10 In the present story, Lyusi’s behavior reproduces this pattern, and so do 
his letters to Moulay Ismail that I mentioned earlier.11 On the other hand, the king tries to 
both legitimize and temper his show of power through enlisting the support of the saint. 
Before the onset of the conflict, the story informs us that Moulay Ismail was holding 
Lyusi in high esteem and had even appointed him as his spiritual advisor.  
Darif argues that in order to secure an exclusive monopoly of power, the king had 
to subdue or at least contain two potential sources of rivalry: 1- the saint as a 
representative of popular Islam, and 2- the ‘alim as a representative of juridical Islam.12 
In this case, Lyusi stands for both popular and juridical Islam. He was a saint who 
swayed popular faith and imagination; a fact to which the present story attests, and a 
‘alim as his letters to Moulay Ismail verify. Most of these letters are written in response 
to requests on the part of Moulay Ismail for fatawa13 about religious as well as temporal 
 
10 It is important to remember in this context that in one historical instance, the social commitment of the 
Moroccan saint went beyond advocating the cause of the people before the king. In the absence of central 
government and in the midst of the political and social turmoil that the country experienced in the fifteenth 
century, Al-Jazuli saw it as his duty to promote a sharifian dynasty that would unify the country and put an 
end to the crisis. In this example, the saint chose the political ruler. 
11 Refer to Kilito’s “Speaking to Princes” for an analysis of these letters. 
12 Muassasat, 48. 
13 Fatawa is the plural form of fatwa referring to a formal legal opinion given by a Muslim religious 
scholar. 
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matters. These letters abound in quotations from the Qur’an and sunna,14 as well as 
stories from the heyday of Islamic civilization. Therefore, by enlisting the support of 
Lyusi, Moulay Ismail is in fact subduing potential rivalry from both saints and ‘alims.
Enlisting the support of the saint, however, did not have as its only aim the 
suppression of potential political rivalry. Indeed, the majority of saints were unable to 
compete with the sultan for the throne. Not all saints were as powerful figures as Lyusi 
was, nor did their influence often reach beyond their local communities. In fact, the 
majority of saints did not actually dream of holding power beyond their communities. 
They did, nonetheless, compete favorably with the king in holding sway of popular 
imagination. The moral authority of the miracle-performing saint stands for a more 
effective form of power at the micro-level of society than does the political power of the 
king. Enlisting the support of the saint is, therefore, the king’s key into both popular 
imagination and the micro-relations of power.  
Moreover, if we accept Darif’s tenable thesis that the sharifian state represents a 
synthesis of the Berber and Islamic visions of government,16 bringing the saint into the 
royal court would have another vital political role to play in the sharifian state. Since the 
local rural saint stands for the popular Islam of the Berber tribe, identifying him with the 
royal court, and hence with the sharifian state, deprives the tribe of a vital mechanism of 
survival. The saint would now pay allegiance to the state rather than the tribe. 
Consequently, he would serve the interests of the state rather than the those of the tribe 
 
14 Sunna refers to the sayings and deeds of the prophet Mohamed. 
 
16 Refer to p. 14. 
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which would thus lose the cornerstone of its political/religious legitimacy.17 In this way, 
the sharifian king aims to reduce the authority of the tribe dramatically, and thus prevent 
what was a nightmare to earlier kings—the dissidence of Berber tribes (s-siba).  
The king’s interest in aligning the miracle-working baraka of the saint with the 
royal palace18 parallels the saint’s own desire to be associated with the sharifian descent 
of the king. At the end of the story, when Lyusi has overpowered Moulay Ismail, he 
surprisingly asks the latter for no less than a royal decree to attest to his, Lyusi’s, 
sharifian descent. Clearly, we are dealing here with a cultural context wherein sharifian 
descent is more valuable than wealth and office. Lyusi is quick to divulge the secret of 
his surprising request; he wants to be entitled to “the appropriate honors, privileges, and 
respect” due to sharifs in Moroccan society. He is therefore seeking to consolidate his 
miraculous power with the prestige that accrues from the fact of being a sharif in 
Moroccan society. Yet, sharifian origin does not only confirm prestige (symbolic and 
material), it also legitimizes power. In the case of the saint, sharifian descent legitimizes 
miraculous baraka and  justifies it in the eyes of the popular masses. It explains to them 
 
17 The identification between the rural saint and the tribe is a complex issue which has solicited much 
deliberation on the part of academics who studied Berber society. There tends to be an agreement, however, 
upon two main roles of rural saints: 1- an organizational role by acting as referees for the tribe, 2- a 
legitimizing role by identifying the forms of rural worship with juridical Islam, hence forestalling any 
threat to the existence of the tribe on religious grounds. For a classical study of the role of rural saints see 
Ernest Gellner, Saints of the Atlas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). As for Darif’s 
contribution on this issue on which I am drawing here, it is best summed up in the following passage from 
his Muassasat where he defines the zawiya (religious lodge) as 
 an organizational tool which is begotten by a tribal entity. Its objective is 
 the defense of this tribal entity against disintegration through providing the 
 conditions that are necessary for the continuity of this entity on the material 
 level first, then on the level of political/religious legitimacy, by associating  
 it with juridical Islam. 
p. 78, my translation.  
 
18 In Morocco, the royal palace is not only an institution. It is a highly developed, self-sufficient society 
referred to as “dar al-mulk” (the house of monarchy). Refer to Abdellah Hammoudi, “The Reinvention of 
Dar al-mulk: The Moroccan Political System and Its Legitimation,” in In the Shadow of the Sultan, 129-
175. 
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the reason why the saint is able to perform such extraordinary feats; it is the prophet’s 
blood that runs in the saint’s veins which is responsible for the benevolent, extraordinary 
interventions of  the saint in the world. Significantly, personal miraculous baraka in this 
case becomes just a manifestation of hereditary baraka whereas it was miraculous baraka 
that the saint has acquired on his own which originally allowed the saint to claim 
sharifian origin. Ironically, the sultan who is a testified descendent of the prophet is under 
the mercy of the saint’s baraka.19 The Sultan’s baraka has a domain of operation of its 
own though. It legitimizes his rule of the Muslim community, and endows him with the 
power necessary to defend Muslim territory against foreign assault, as well internal 
disorder.  During Moulay Ismail’s rule, Morocco was especially strong and secure. 
The story clearly dramatizes the politics of hereditary and personal baraka in 
Morocco. According to Geertz, it is also 
 a folktale commentary on the delicate relationship between strong- 
 man politics and holy-man piety, the continuously sought but only 
 sporadically effected effort to fuse the force of the warrior and the  
virtue of the saint, which … is the leitmotiv of Moroccan history.20 
Analyzing the relationship between the king and the saint in terms of the oppositions 
“holy-man piety vs. strong- man politics” and “the saint’s virtue vs. the warrior’s force” 
is counterproductive for understanding the historical relationship between the sharifian 
king and the saint. It is true that Geertz argues that these oppositions are fused in the 
persons of king and saint, yet presupposing them initially creates analytical problems as 
 
19This pattern of interaction between saint and king is recurrent in popular legends. For other stories of 
saint/king confrontations, see Raymond Jamous, “Le Saint et le Possede,” Gradhiva: Revue D’Histoire et 
D’Archives de l’Anthropologie, No. 17(1995): 62-83. The stories recounted by Jamous in this article, 
however, hardly have any historical reference. 
20 Islam Observed, 33. 
28
well as historical inaccuracies. Moreover, these oppositions indirectly cast the Moroccan 
saint and king in the universal image of the king as the strong warrior and the saint as the 
virtuous holy man. As a result, Geertz’s conception of the conflict between the two 
figures glosses over the peculiar nature of both the holiness of the saint and the force of 
the sharifian king in Morocco. At the origin of Geertz’s reading of the relationship 
between saint and king, as well as his general interpretation of Moroccan history, is his 
view of baraka as a uniform, monolithic category that epitomizes a historically constant 
cultural conception of the world. He contends that 
 baraka clung to the sultan, and to certain members of his staff, the 
 Maxzen, as it clung to certain descendants of saints and certain  
chiefs of brotherhoods. Despite their enormous differences in status, 
power, and function, and despite the fact that they were all in more 
or less  open opposition to one another, they were, from the religious 
point of view, all the same sort of figures. Popular saint worship, 
sufist doctrine (both Spanish and Middle Eastern), and the sherifian 
principle all flowed together, like a swelling stream, into a single 
precut spiritual channel: maraboutism.21 
Historically, the religious point of view was only one factor, among many, behind 
shaping the relationship between the figures Geertz mentions in this excerpt.22 Moreover, 
the religious factor derived its saliency from its legitimizing function. Otherwise, it was 
no less negotiable than other factors. As for the argument that the members of the saintly 
and monarchic institutions were essentially the same figures by virtue of their possession 
 
21 Islam Observed, 55-56. 
22 It is important to note that the makhzen was not invested with baraka as Geertz claims. 
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of the same baraka, it is hardly tenable. The differences in status and function did 
actually make a difference. These figures do not possess the same type of baraka, nor do 
they deploy it similarly. What these figures had in common is their possession of a 
symbolic capital which  has accrued to them through different means and which they 
deploy in different ways to accumulate more social and political power. How they deploy 
this symbolic capital depends upon their personal resources as well as upon the 
possibilities offered by historical, political, and social factors. Moroccan history did not 
unfold through the constant conflict between the virtue of the saint and the force of the 
king, each trying to take over the role of the other. The politics of saint/king interaction 
was much more complex.23 In the following sections, I examine two examples wherein 
different historical contexts shaped king/saint relationship in opposite directions—
military confrontation during the reign of Sultan Moulay Slimane (1792-1822), and 
strategic, mainly discursive, alliance in the post-9/11 historical context.  
 
III- Sultan Moulay Slimane Against the Saintly Institution:  
Moulay Slimane came to the throne in 1792 when Morocco was experiencing various 
economic and political difficulties because of drought and plague.1 His policy of extreme 
protectionism did nothing but aggravate the economic setback of the country. He banned 
maritime trade with European countries, which stifled the economy and led to much 
discontent and political tension in Moroccan society. An excessive form of prudence was 
the driving force behind Moulay Slimane’s policy. Yet, this prudence was counter-
productive since it weakened the country, and thus made it even more open to the 
 
23 And so is the dynamics of history, one is tempted to remind Geertz. 
1 See Driss Ksikes and Youssef Aït Akdim, “L’Histoire Occultee du Maroc,” Tel Quel, No. 152 (2005). 
<http://www.telquel-online.com/152/couverture_152_1.shtml> 
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European expansionist threats instead of shielding it against these threats. Furthermore, it 
triggered the much-feared fitna inside the country. 
 The greatest internal threat that Moulay Slimane faced was the rebellion of Berber 
tribes from the Atlas Mountains under the leadership of Abou-Bakr Mhawesh. The latter 
was a Berber who claimed sharifian descent. He was the head of the zawiya of Ait Ali 
Mhawesh by the time Moulay Slimane was enthroned.2 The confrontation between the 
two parties was triggered by Moulay Slimane’s anti-Berber policy,3 the economic crisis 
incurred, or at least aggravated, by his protectionism, as well as the desire of the Berber 
tribes to take over a weak, impoverished makhzen.  
 Ultimately, Mhawesh’s became a political movement championing the cause of a 
Berber rebellion against the makhzen, rather than a religious order. While this historical 
event seems to undermine my earlier critique of Geertz’s reading of Moroccan history, it 
in fact corroborates it. Geertz’s thesis is predicated upon the notion of strong-man politics 
and holy-man piety. Moroccan history, according to him, was made up by two figures—
the saint and the king—who fought to possess both charisma and military power. From 
the outset, Mhawesh seems to illustrate Geertz’s marabout perfectly. However, Mhawesh 
actually surrendered his role of saint when he acquired so much military power, and 
became the competitor of the king for the throne. As I noted earlier, the king and saint are 
essentially distinct figures although they share in baraka and sharifism.5 Mhawesh could 
not aspire to play both roles. As he was approaching the final military victory that would 
 
2 For biographical details about Abu-Bakr Mhawesh, refer to Darif, Muassasat, 96. For details about his 
zawiya, Refer to the same source, pp. 109-111. 
3 See Darif, Muassasat, 98, and the 2000 Berber manifesto posted at 
<http://amazighworld.net/human_rights/morocco/manifesto2000fr.php> The manifesto claims that Moulay 
Slimane ultimately changed his views about the Berbers which he formed through the false accounts 
transmitted to him by those who “knot and unknot” (in reference to decision-makers) in the city of Fez. 
5 For the elaboration of this point, see M.E. Combs-Schilling, Sacred Performances: Islam, Sexuality, and 
Sacrifice. 
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have enthroned him,6 he was growing distant from his saintliness, and his saintly 
institution—the zawiya—from its primary historical role.7 Discussing the same example, 
Darif insightfully comments, “the zawiya in this case denied itself… by going back to the 
pre-zawiya era.”8 He is referring here to the Khaldunian Morocco of the great Berber 
dynasties, when political authority relied upon group feelings (‘asabiyya), correspondent 
in this case with the Berber tribe.9
The issue of trespassing the fine line between saint and king aside, Mhawesh and 
the other saints who bore arms and set out on military expeditions against the makhzen 
were not representative of the typical Moroccan saint. Primarily, the latter was a socially 
rather than politically committed figure. Moreover, when dwelling upon saints in 
Morocco, we have to remember that the majority of saints in the country were 
functioning at the popular level and could not aspire to amass enough power to allow 
them to bear arms against the makhzen.  
 Only a few saints could ever achieve the political and military power that 
Mhawesh possessed during the rule of Moulay Slimane. He succeeded in rallying more 
and more Berber tribes around him, and managed to enlist the support of even those 
tribes that were traditionally allied with the makhzen. As a result, he overpowered 
Moulay Slimane militarily. Moulay Slimane’s troubles reached their peak in the battle of 
Zayan (1818) where he was incarcerated and his son killed. Eventually, Moulay Slimane 
abdicated in 1822.12 His abdication seems to have been necessary in order to save the 
 
6 He never achieved that final decisive victory however, although he managed to rally more Berber tribes, 
and to extend the rebellion till it reached the walls of Meknes in 1819. 
7 For the elaboration of the role of zawiya in the tribe, see Darif. 
8 Muassasat, 99. My translation. 
9 Refer to the introduction. 
12 According to the Berber Manifesto (see note 4 in this section), he abdicated because the political 
intelligentsia of Fez turned against him when he changed his anti-Berber policy and advocated 
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institution of the sharifian state from an eminent disintegration incurred by the failure of 
his general political policy, as well as his religious policy. 
 Moulay Slimane was a faqih,13 and according to some,14 the most cultured of 
‘Alawite kings. Before coming to the throne, he spent his time in Tafilalt15 studying 
theology.16 He embraced the Wahhabi doctrine which he initially encountered through 
pilgrims returning from Mecca. Moulay Slimane seems to have been predisposed to 
embrace the teachings of Mohamed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1791) since he opposed 
all sorts of innovation (bid‘a)17 that accrued to the religion of Islam after the time of the 
prophet Mohamed and the rightly guided Caliphs,18 and advocated strict and exhaustive 
application of the shari‘a.19 As a monarch though, he officially professed his wahhabi 
affiliation. In 1811, he sent a delegation of judges and ‘alims to the Saudi leader with a 
letter of reassurance that reads: “This letter aims at dissipating any suspicion on your part 
that we are opposed to your ideas.”20 
The most consequential  application of Wahhabi teachings on the part of Moulay 
Slimane, however, was his opposition to saint veneration. This opposition is best 
 
reconciliation with Berbers. When Moulay Slimane had the opportunity to communicate with Berbers 
directly, without the mediation of Fassi decision-makers, there was, the manifesto claims, a dramatic 
change in his anti-Berber policy. He spoke to the people of Fez exhorting them to reconcile with Berbers, 
whom he characterized favorably this time, if they wanted peace for their country. The view generally held 
by historians, however, is that he abdicated in order to save the sharifian state from disintegration. See 
Darif, 125.   
13 The faqih is a legist, someone learned in Islamic law. 
14 See the Berber Manifesto. In the same vein, Driss Ksikes and Youssef Aït Akdim argue in their 
“L’Histoire Occultee du Maroc” that Moulay Slimane was more of a faqih than a king. 
15 Tafilalt is the home of the ‘Alawites in southern Morocco . 
16 Driss Ksikes and Youssef Aït Akdim, “L’Histoire Occultee du Maroc.” 
17 Bid‘a (pl. bida‘) is a poignant term in the Islamic juridical tradition. It refers to an innovation or 
deviation from the tradition of the prophet and his companions. Bida‘ are generally condemned by legists. 
It is noteworthy though that the concept of deviation from the true Islamic tradition has often been 
deployed for political purposes. 
18 These are Abu-Bakr, ‘Omar, ‘Othman, and ‘Ali; he prophet’s companions who became caliphs after his 
death. 
19 Shari‘a refers to Islamic law. 
20 Quoted in Driss Ksikes and Youssef Aït Akdim, “L’Histoire Occultee du Maroc.” My translation. 
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expressed in his letter against zawaya and mawasim. Whether Moulay Slimane opposed 
mawasim and zawaya out of true faithfulness to Wahhabi doctrine, or out of political 
intrigue against Berber tribes is of little import here since Wahhabi doctrine served his 
political interest in both cases.21 In what follows, I analyze the content of this letter and 
its political import.22 
Moulay Slimane invokes surrendering to God, following the sunna of his prophet 
Mohamed and the ways of his companions, as well as obeying the Islamic ruler (ulu al-
amr) as principles of the Islamic shari‘a. These principles are stressed throughout the 
letter, but they are given more saliency in the formulaic introduction which paves the way 
towards Moulay Slimane’s unprecedented advice to the people of Morocco. Parallel to 
his claim for obedience on the part of his people, Moulay Slimane stresses his own 
responsibility for their moral uprightness through advising and spiritually guiding them. 
This responsibility, he claims, makes it incumbent upon him to upbraid them for 
following the path of Satan and corrupting their religion with gruesome bida‘. Not only 
are these deviations from the shari‘a harmful morally and intellectually, but they also 
push people to spend money mindlessly in mawasim instead of giving it in alms to the 
needy. Moulay Slimane makes it clear that spending money in saints’ festivals is illegal, 
and so is saint worship. 
Moulay Slimane argues through historical examples from the early era of Islam, 
and through invoking the authority of the Qur’an and sunna. Indeed, the letter abounds in 
Quranic verses and sayings of the prophet. Employing a series of rhetorical questions that 
 
21 It did so in the sense that it provided him with a good religious basis for building up his strong criticism 
of the proponents of the saintly institution. I am aware, however, that practically this opposition caused a 
backlash and incurred animosity from Berbers. 
22 I analyze this letter as it is reproduced by Darif in his Muassasat, pp. 146-149. 
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are meant to disarm any counterargument, the sultan asks the people whether Mohamed 
organized any festival to commemorate the death of his uncle Hamza as a martyr, and 
whether he decorated the tombs of his companions, etc ... Since these practices have no 
basis in the early days of Islam which constitute the golden era when the rightful ones 
lived, then, the sultan argues, they must be corrupt additions by the less faithful 
successors. The Wahhabi influence is evident in this argument.  
Moulay Slimane warns the people against contending that these practices are the 
legacy of their ancestors and that they should therefore follow in their footsteps, since 
this is the same argument that the Qur’an attributes to the unfaithful. The Sultan is 
implying here that those who venerate saints verge on disbelief. He characterizes their 
practices as un-Islamic. Singing, dancing, clapping hands, raising flags, and the 
intermingling of men, women, and children for dhikr23 are all condemned by Moulay 
Slimane as vile deviations from the tradition of Mohamed. The only form of dhikr that is 
sanctioned by the shari‘a is that practiced by Mohamed and his companions and that does 
not involve the raising of voices and flags, nor gatherings. All other forms are distortions 
of God’s laws and should not be tolerated. In fact, Moulay Slimane goes as far as 
asserting that those who possess authority in Muslim society should not allow proponents 
of zawaya and turuq (sg. tariqa) into mosques. Otherwise, they would be accomplices 
and so would the Sultan be if he does nothing to reform this state and prevent Moroccan 
society from sinking in bida‘ and sins. Deviating from the true path of Islam as delineated 
in the Qur’an and sunna, Moulay Slimane affirms, would court the anger of God against 
Moroccan society. As a result, Morocco would be struck by drought, famine, illness, and 
 
23 Dhikr generally refers to the repetition of certain words and phrases in praise of God. In Sufi rituals, it 
refers to the rhythmic chanting of God’s divine names and phrases of praise (also sama‘) so as to bring 
about a state of meditation or ecstasy (al-hal). 
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territorial disintegration. “Impoliteness towards God opens the door to calamities, and 
closes the path to welfare,”24 The sultan asserts. 
Towards the end of the letter, Moulay Slimane cites a long hadith25 that foresees 
the differences between Muslims after the prophet’s death, exhorts Muslims to follow the 
path of Mohamed and the rightfully-guided caliphs, and to obey their governor even if he 
were a black slave. The hadith also warns them against bida‘. Finally, the sultan asks his 
people to bear witness to the fact that he has advised, warned, and guided. He closes on a 
strong tone informing them that he who still attends mawassim, or creates any other sort 
of bida‘ will bring about his own, as well as his people’s, destruction. 
The Wahhabi influence is evident in the letter. In fact, Wahhabi doctrine is 
predicated upon the purification of Islam from the bida‘ that accrued to it after the death 
of the prophet and his companions. Wahhabis regard Sufism and saint veneration as chief 
bida’ against which true Muslims should fight. Whether Moulay Slimane wrote his letter 
against zawaya and mawasim out of faith to Wahhabism or not is of little import to my 
argument in this paper, although there is an agreement among historians that he was 
actually a Wahhabi. In examining this letter, I am interested in another example of the 
dynamics of king-saint relationship. In this example, Wahhabism served Moulay Slimane 
as the ideological basis upon which he founded his anti-saint policy. This policy was 
Moulay Slimane’s response to the incursion of the Berber tribe under the leadership of a 
zawiya.
Traditionally, the zawiya and the tribe are allies. The zawiya mediates between the 
popular Islam of the tribe which is informed by the ‘urf (customary law) and the high 
 
24 From the letter, my translation. 
25 A hadith is a saying of the prophet. 
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tradition of juridical Islam. In this sense, the zawiya invests the tribe with religious 
legitimacy. On the economic level, the zawiya organizes yearly festivals (mawasim) that 
are attended by hundreds of pilgrims. It thus provides the tribe with a major economic 
resource. On the political level, the zawiya mediates between the tribe and the makhzen,
and has traditionally succeeded in forestalling many confrontations between the two 
parties.24 
In the case of the zawiya of Ait Ali Mhawesh during the rule of Moulay Slimane, 
the zawiya and the tribe became military allies as well. Abu-Bakr Mhawesh led the Atlas 
Berber tribes in their revolt against Moulay Slimane. Gradually, his became a political 
movement against the makhzen rather than a zawiya. Therefore, by attacking the saintly 
institution, Moulay Slimane was in fact attacking the recalcitrant Berber tribe.  
Moulay Slimane deployed Wahhabism in order to exclude the zawiya and thus the 
tribe from the shari‘a. The zawiya is part of the saintly institution that has, according to 
him, corrupted Islam with many innovations (bida‘) drawn from tribal ‘urf. In this way, 
he establishes a dichotomy between the zawiya, tribe, and ’urf on the one hand, and 
makhzen, Islamic community, and shari‘a on the other. The implication is that while the 
makhzen tries to implement shari‘a by force, the tribe, through the help of the zawiya,
sticks to the ‘urf, corrupts Islam, and wants s-siba to prevail. From the makhzen’s point of 
view, s-siba is a form of anarchy that threatens the country with fitna and violates a major 
principle of the shari‘a; namely, obedience of the Islamic ruler who is in the case of the 
 
24 The zawiya of Wazzan, for example, forestalled many such confrontations in the north. For an account of 
the political role of this zawiya, see the long excerpt from G. Drague’s Esquisse d’Histoire Religieuse du 
Maroc (1951) in Darif, 112-116. 
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sharifian king the “Prince of the Faithful.”25 In this way, Moulay Slimane de-legitimizes 
the zawiya, the tribe and their allied resistance to the makhzen at the same time as he 
legitimizes the latter’s struggle against them. 
The zawiya has always insisted to wear the guise of juridical Islam so as to gain 
religious legitimacy both for itself and for the tribe. The guise and the religious 
legitimacy it grants, guarantee the survival of both zawiya and tribe not only through the 
resources brought in by mawasim, but also (for the zawiya) through the privileges that the 
makhzen granted.26 Therefore, by excluding the zawiya from the shari‘a, Moulay Slimane 
is not only stripping zawiya and tribe of religious legitimacy, and their resources of 
mawasim, but he is also depriving the zawiya from the privileges which have become an 
acquired right of the zawiya by tradition. Moulay Slimane’s letter seeks to undermine 
both the discursive and material conditions for the existence of the zawiya and by 
extension the Berber tribe. 
Not able to vanquish Mhawesh in battle, Moulay Slimane resorted to what he is 
best at—fiqh. In his letter, Moulay Slimane speaks with the authority of the faqih, in fact 
the Wahhabi Faqih, and displays his knowledge of Islamic history and the shari‘a. His 
discursive authority here is bolstered by the fact the he is a sharif whereas Mhawesh, his 
opponent whom he indirectly addresses here, is not (despite his claim to the contrary). It 
is true that sharifism is not invoked in the letter, yet it is present in the person of the 
speaker—Moulay Slimane—who stands for the institution of the sharifian state from 
 
25 From the perspective of the tribe, however, s-siba is a way of resisting the encroachment of the makhzen,
protecting its ‘urf, and thus its cultural identity. 
 
26 Officially, the zawiya received special privileges from the makhzen (e.g. exemption from taxation, 
landownership, etc…) in recognition of the sharifian origin of its patron saint and his descendents, their 
baraka, as well as their special religious status. In reality, however, these privileges were in return for the 
services it rendered. 
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which he cannot tear himself away, not that there is any reason to believe that he wanted 
to. Being a descendent of the prophet places one in a better position to speak against 
deviation from the true path of the prophet. One in this case can embody the shari‘a. 
Another discursive function of Moulay Slimane’s letter against zawaya and 
mawasim is to justify the economic difficulties and political unrest that struck the country 
during his rule. Moulay Slimane is a believer in baraka. In this letter, he talks about the 
decrease in the baraka of crops referring to the insufficiency of these crops. In another 
letter, he refers to a certain ‘alim with the word baraka.27 Yet, it is clear that the baraka 
in which he believes is not that of the saint. His notion of baraka corresponds rather with 
true Islamic faith and exact application of the shari‘a. Baraka turns into bas when society 
deviates from the true path and gives in to illegitimate bida‘. Moulay Slimane describes 
in his letter what befalls a society that gives in to Satan, worships saints, and wastes 
money in illegitimate, mindless ways. Such a society is cursed, just like the Moroccan 
society at the time, with drought, famine, epidemics, and foreign conquest. In this way, 
Moulay Slimane lays the blame upon the saintly institution and forestalls the popular 
argument that the country suffered from the lack of the baraka of its king.  
Although Moulay Slimane’s letter was not effective in undermining the 
legitimacy of the saintly institution whose influence remained intact, opponents of this 
institution appropriated it on many historical occasions. In 1935, for example, the 
conservative leaders of the nationalist movement published it in a small booklet that was 
widely distributed.28 In the context of colonialism, there was no room for a zawiya that is 
 
27 See his letter to ‘Ali Ben Ahmed Al-Wazzani in Darif, p. 145. 
28 Darif, 153. 
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allied with the tribe. The model was now that of a unified Islamic nation, and the 
protagonists were the Sultan and the faqih/nationalist leader.29 
In the following section, I examine king/saint relationship in contemporary 
Morocco. In the present historical context, Moulay Slimane’s letter sunk to oblivion as 
the sharifian king’s political interest obliged him to seek alliance with the saint as a 
cultural model.  
 
IV- King Mohamed VI and Sufism after 9/11: 
On May 16, 2003, twelve suicide bombers hit Western and Jewish targets in 
Casablanca—the economic capital of Morocco, killing thirty-three civilians and 
wounding more than a hundred people. The bombers were all young Moroccan men 
believed to be members of an islamist fundamentalist group called Salafia Jihadia. In a 
country where people had never experienced the threat of terrorism before, the 
psychological effect of the attacks was devastating. The country that had escaped the 
reach of violence from neighboring Algeria for years, had now entered the cycle of 
international terror. Many Moroccans could not believe that the attacks were carried out 
by fellow Moroccans. When it was officially declared that the perpetrators were all 
Moroccan, Moroccans and Western observers finally conceded that Moroccan Islam1 had 
dramatically changed. For Western academics, it was no longer the Islam of saint 
 
29 As a matter of fact, those were the ideals that were promoted by the nationalist movement, but in reality, 
the saint remained influential throughout the colonial period. 
1 The term “Moroccan Islam” was used by Geertz in his Islam Observed. Later on, Dale Eikelman used it 
in the title of his book Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1976). In the context of this paper, I use the term in order to imply the peculiar nature of 
Islam in Morocco. I do not mean, however, to essentialize its difference from Islam in other countries. 
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worship. For Moroccan citizens, it was no longer the moderate Islam upon which they 
have long prided themselves. 
 The then novice king (only four years in office) Mohamed VI took it upon himself 
to ameliorate the image of Moroccan Islam. Not only did he implement a new religious 
policy,2 but he also generated a consistent discourse, in his speeches and letters, wherein 
he invoked Sufism3 as the alternative to terror-inciting Islamism. Mohamed VI’s 
promotion of Sufism was coterminous with an international call for the revival of Sufism 
after 9/11.4 In this section, I analyze his letter to the inaugural meeting of the 
international Sidi Shikr Sufi convention held in Marrakech in September 2004 under the 
aegis of his majesty. I read  this letter as a modern-time example of the dynamism of 
king/saint relationship in its response to different historical contexts. 
 In this letter, just like elsewhere in the royal discourse after the attacks, the king 
clearly aims to restore the image of Morocco in the international community as an open, 
tolerant society. The attacks targeted the symbols of  foreign presence in the country (a 
Jewish community center, a five-star hotel, and restaurants owned by foreigners), and it is 
now the king’s duty to prove the “bigotry” and “fanaticism”5 that led to the attacks as the 
exception not the norm in Moroccan society. What is at stake in this context is not only 
the image of Morocco, but also, and more importantly perhaps, tourism—a vital 
 
2 This religious policy consists mainly of restructuring the Higher Council of Ulema, reviving the old 
religious schools, and reforming the Islamic Education curriculum. Refer to his April 30, 2004 address to 
the Higher Council of Ulema posted on the Maghreb Arab Press website. 
3 Mohamed VI uses the term Sufism synonymously with sainthood.  
4 See “The Search for Sufism,” Top Secret, Narr. Yusri Fouda, Aljazeera Channel, 1 April 2004. 
<http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/top_secret/articles/2004/4/4-5-1.htm> 
5 These are Mohamed VI’s words which he used to describe the Islamist thought of the perpetrators in his 
first address to the people of Morocco after the attacks. See his May 29, 2003 speech posted on the MAP 
website. 
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economic sector for a third-world country, which has suffered a fatal blow after the 
attacks. 
 Mohamed VI valorizes the mystic Sufi as an exemplary figure, and opposes him 
to the politically engaged Islamist whom he indirectly6 denigrates as the Sufi’s 
antithesis—an epitome of bigotry, fanaticism, and grudge. He implicitly blames the 
attacks upon the waning of the Sufi spirit in Moroccan society, and encourages the 
participants in the conference to  revive this spirit as a counter-measure against 
extremism and intolerance. 
From the perspective of Mohamed VI in this letter, the promotion of Sufism on 
the part of Moroccans would be a return to the norm. Indeed, he defines Moroccan 
history and society in terms of Sufism. In a moralistic piece of history, he informs the 
participants in the conference that 
 the people of this good land were aware, since their embracing  
of Islam, that the essence of faith is the purification of the soul from  
selfishness, grudge, and bigotry (…) and the exercise of self-control  
and supervision of daily behavior, for the attainment of the kind  
of spiritual perfection that is termed Sufism.7
The dominant figure in Moroccan history, then, is the Sufi not the Islamist, and the 
dominant values are those taught by Sufi-practice not extremism.  
Throughout the letter, the king extols the values promoted by Sufism in general—
purification of the soul, spiritual elevation, self-control, tolerance, etc… He devotes, 
 
6 The denigration of the islamist is implicit here only because the letter is addressed to a Sufi convention; 
hence the opposition between the Sufi and the islamist remains a subtext. Otherwise, Mohamed VI has 
been very explicit in his condemnation of islamism, and has described the perpetrators of the attacks in 
very strong words in his first address to the people of Morocco after the attacks (May 29, 2003). 
7 My translation. The letter was read at the conference by a consultant of the king. 
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however, a long paragraph to explicating a special feature of Moroccan Sufism; namely, 
the educational and social commitment of the Moroccan Sufi. Throughout Moroccan 
history, the latter has been active in teaching the Qur’an, finding madaris8 and libraries, 
serving as a referee, mediating tribal and ethnic differences, etc… However, the king 
singles out three roles as worthy of special praise. These are: 1- the support and 
assistance of the ‘imama9 in carrying out its duties, 2- the purification of souls from 
power-thirst, selfishness, and tyranny, and 3- the upbringing of  (Sufi) leaders whose 
universal aspirations did not clash with their nationalistic10 feelings.  
Mohamed VI reconstructs the history of Moroccan sainthood selectively. He 
accurately notes the peculiarity of the Moroccan saint as a socially committed figure. He, 
nevertheless, selects only one pattern of the historical relationship between the Moroccan 
saint and king for inclusion in his letter. Obviously, the pattern that he selects is the one 
that best suits his needs in this historical context. Depicting the saint as a traditional 
supporter of the sharifian monarchy would promote the image of Moroccan society as a 
peaceful one in which the icons of temporal and spiritual power are allied in their joined 
effort to serve the Muslim community. On the other hand, asserting the traditional 
support of the saint for the king legitimizes the authority of the latter. What is left out of 
the story told here is that the relationship between saint and king was oftentimes tense. 
The pattern of support and alliance, therefore, existed along with other patterns that do 
not lend themselves to easy generalizations. So many factors contributed to the shaping 
of saint/king relationship in different historical periods, making it complex and highly 
 
8 Madaris (sg. madrasa) are religious schools. 
9 ‘Imama refers to the religious leadership of the Muslim community, in this case the monarchy. 
10 “Nationalistic” here refers to the feeling of belonging to a homeland, of being Moroccan. It does not 
carry the notion of the modern nation-state. 
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dynamic, just like 9/11 and the May attacks contributed to Mohamed VI’s effortful 
promotion of Sufism and valorization of the saint. 
In striking contrast to the move of his ancestor Moulay Slimane who placed saints 
and zawaya outside the framework of shari‘a,11 Mohamed VI aligns them with the high 
tradition of juridical Islam. Ironically, while the saintly institution, from the perspective 
of Moulay Slimane, promotes bida‘ and corrupts Muslim society, according to Mohamed 
VI, it fights bida‘, extremism, and corruption, and promotes pacifism and high morals 
instead. Indeed, Mohamed VI goes as far as stating that the values and ways of mystics 
and saints12 are derived from the Qur’an and sunna, therefore they should not be looked 
upon as a frozen, outdated tradition. He depicts the kind of perfection achieved by saints 
as the model which everyone should strive to emulate. 
Mohamed VI is clearly aware that the saintly tradition creates more of a cultural 
heritage than a lived reality while politically active islamism is taking over. It is the 
activist islamist who now poses a threat to the monarchy. The saint has ceased to pose 
any real political threat since king Hassan II13 domesticated him. A word on Hassan the 
Second’s policy towards the saintly institution is in order here. During his rule, Hassan II 
started by centralizing the administration of all the major mausoleums of the country. 
Then, at a later stage, he relegated the administration of each to a delegation of select 
 
11 Refer to the previous section. 
12 In this particular statement, Mohamed VI uses the terms Zuhhad and Salihin. Zuhhad refers to mystics 
whereas salihin formally refers to one specific type of saints. I will not elaborate upon the characteristics of 
this type of saints since it does not affect my argument here. Moreover, in popular usage, the word salih has 
come to refer to all sorts of saints. 
13 King Hassan II is the father of the present king. He deployed his intelligence, special diplomatic skills, 
and unbounded monopoly of power to rule the country for 38 years, from 1961 until his death in 1999. He 
survived two coups, suppressed opposition from both army and islamists, and employed the Moroccan 
cultural heritage effectively in order to substantiate his authority. For an account of the rule of king Hassan 
II, see Stephen O. Hughes, Morocco Under King Hassan (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2001).  
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descendents of its patron saint.14 These delegations were affiliated with the Ministry of 
Interior. As for the secretary general of the Idrissides, Morocco’s most prestigious sharifs 
by virtue of their descent from Idriss I, he was put under the direct supervision of the 
minister of Interior. Furthermore, one of the king’s official advisors, Moulay Ahmed 
‘Alawite, himself an ‘Alawite sharif, took on the role of supervising and attending the big 
mawasim.15 
Besides inheriting a politically domesticated saint from his father, Mohamed VI 
came to power in a historical moment when the saint had lost his ability of miraculous 
intervention in the world, although he still resonated in Moroccan culture. Moroccans are 
now skeptical about the ability of blood descent to confer baraka. The secularists among 
them reject baraka as mere superstition and primitive spirituality, and the islamists deny 
the ability to intervene in the world to all but prophets. Moreover, both are aware that 
sharifism has been a tool of monopolizing power and legitimizing it. Apart from these 
two parties, there are of course those who value the saintly tradition not out of faith in it, 
but out of faithfulness to a main component of Moroccan cultural heritage. For these, 
baraka is now correspondent with moral force, and sharifian descent no more than a 
culturally-conditioned social distinction. A fourth fraction of Moroccan society consists 
of the elderly illiterate whose numbers are dwindling but who still constitute the majority 
 
14 These descendents are supposed to have inherited their ancestor’s baraka. Moreover, since The patron 
saints of the great mausoleums are all sharifs, their descendents are sharifs (Moroccan Ar. shorfa) as well. 
These delegations are called niqabat shorfa.
15 For the information regarding Hassan the Second’s policy towards the saintly institution, see Driss 
Ksikes, “Les Chorfa Menent la Danse.” It is interesting that besides the many similarities between king 
Hassan II and his ancestor Sultan Moulay Ismail, the two seem to also share in common similar policies 
towards the saints. Sultan Moulay Ismail attempted to domesticate the zawaya by requiring them to have 
their central lodge in the city of Fez. For Moulay Ismail’s policy towards zawaya, refer to Darif, 131-134. 
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of the modern saints’ adepts.16 Meanwhile, those to whom privileges have previously 
accrued thanks to sharifian descent still enjoy those privileges. 
As the influence of the saint waned, the allure of the islamist gained ground. By 
the time Mohamed VI was enthroned, it was religious parties and groups rather than 
religious brotherhoods which were attracting the youth, the downtrodden, and the 
dispossessed. After 9/11, the islamist groups became even more active. Ultimately, 
terror-proof Morocco was brought into the cycle of international terrorism by its own 
citizens, a group of youths from the poor masses. 
The return to sainthood seemed a good alternative to the kind of Islam that 
propelled the attacks. Mohamed VI portrays the saint as an exemplary figure. He extols 
“the white hands of mystics upon Islamic civilization.”17 The grand narrative of the 
king’s discourse opposes the pacifying, purging influence of the Sufi to the disquieting, 
“criminal” impact the politically motivated islamist. Significantly enough, when 
reconstructing the history of the Moroccan saint, Mohamed VI mentions the latter’s 
social and educational commitment and ignores the political potential of the saintly 
institution. Moreover, he aligns the saints directly with juridical Islam in order to thwart 
the islamists’ contention that sainthood is a form of heterodoxy. 
Both as a Wahhabi faqih and as a king at war with Berber tribes, Moulay Slimane 
could not but oppose sainthood and place it outside the framework of shari‘a. Mohamed 
VI, however, could not recommend something better than Sufism for his terror-stricken 
society. Sufism offered the spiritual solace that is needed in time of hardship without 
 
16 I do by no means intend my delineation of the scene in Moroccan society with regard to people’s attitude 
towards the saintly institution to be rigid and definite. As a matter of fact, there are many Moroccans who 
do not fall in any of the four categories I have delineated here. My aim is rather to sketch the general scene 
against which Mohamed VI launched his pro-Sufism policy. 
17 From the Sidi Shikr letter. My translation.  
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threatening of the ‘excesses’ of Islamism. Yet, the Sufi model he presented had to be 
delineated in such a way that it would reconstruct from the history of Moroccan Sufism 
only what would serve the needs of the present political situation.   
To sum up, Mohamed the VI valorized the saint as an exemplary figure in his 
post-the-Casablanca-attacks discourse as part of his general policy of promoting Sufism 
that targeted both domestic and international audiences. On the international level, his 
policy was intended to restore the image of Moroccan society as an open, tolerant one 
that is practicing a moderate form of Islam. Furthermore, his policy converged with an 
international move towards reviving the culture of Sufism. On the domestic level, his 
move was meant to provide the Moroccan people with a spiritual model to look up to in a 
time of deep disorientation, and to strengthen their faith in their culture as well as 
governing institution. In the absence of any substantial threat from a domesticated saintly 
institution, Mohamed VI tries to revive a centuries-old tradition and activate the symbolic 
capital of the saint in order to prevail upon the newly acquired influence of the islamists. 
The image he invokes is that of a supportive saint who “deepened the love of Mohamed’s 
family (ahl al-bayt) in people’s hearts.”18 Now that the saint had substantially lost his 
influence and was forced to resign to cultural archives, the sharifian king appropriates his 
symbolic capital, and affirms his overall authority over the religious domain as “Prince of 
the Faithful.”19 If the saint is to return, he has to do so in the manner that best suits the 
needs of a modern sharifian state surviving the post 9/11 turmoil.  
 
18 From the letter. My translation. Of course, what is meant by the prophet’s family is the ‘Alawites. 
19 Indeed, he opens the letter by stating that “the title Prince of the Faithful makes [him] responsible for the 
supervision of the religious domain in all its manifestations and dimensions.” My translation.  
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Conclusion: 
As I was analyzing my third example from contemporary Morocco, Mohamed VI was 
celebrating the circumcision of his son, the crown prince, Moulay Al-Hassan at the shrine 
of Idriss II in Fez, in compliance with the Moroccan royal tradition.1 Compliance with the 
royal tradition as far as the public celebration of the circumcision of the crown prince in 
the mausoleum of Moulay Idriss II stands in sharp contrast to Mohamed VI’s many 
departures from the royal tradition.2 Yet, it converges with his general policy of 
promoting the Moroccan saintly heritage. A few days after the celebration of the 
circumcision at the Moulay Idriss Mausoleum, the king moved to the nearby city of 
Meknes to celebrate the birthday of the prophet at another great mausoleum; that of 
Sheikh Al-Kamel. 
Clearly, Mohamed VI is capitalizing on a rich tradition of king/saint relationship 
in order to consolidate his religious and political authority, and promote a pacifist 
moderate form of Islam as the true Moroccan Islam. Because the tradition upon which 
Mohamed VI is drawing is so old, complex, and varied, he can reinterpret it and select 
from it at will, especially when the other party in this tradition has become little more 
than a cultural icon. And so he does. He equates sainthood in Morocco with Sufism, and 
selects from its history only what would serve the most urgent need of the present 
historical context: to ward off the threat of the islamist. Significantly, it is now the 
islamist who indirectly shapes the relationship between saint and sharifian king. In the 
face of a common threat, king and saint improvise an alliance and turn to history to 
 
1 See the official website of Maghreb Arab Press <http://www.map.co.ma/mapara/cir-ara/index.htm> 
2 The most salient departure from this tradition is the public celebration of his wedding to a young 
Moroccan girl. Mohamed VI is the first Moroccan king to publicly celebrate his wedding, and to allow his 
wife to appear in public.  
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legitimize it. Yet, it is now the king who is in full control of the relationship since all the 
major saintly lineages and lodges have been placed under the custody of the central 
government.  
Moulay Slimane who, in his time and given his Wahhabi affiliation, would have 
considered the very idea of celebrating the prophet’s birthday a bid‘a, would have been 
further mortified by the prospect of a descendent of his celebrating it in a saint’s 
mausoleum. But the times are different, and different historical contexts call for different 
political and religious policies. No matter how enduring the Moroccan kings’ policies 
towards the saintly institution might have seemed to Geertz and others, in fact these 
policies have varied in response to different historical contexts. And so did the saints’ 
attitudes towards the monarchy as well. This ability to adapt and to respond differently to 
different historical contexts is what allowed both the sharifian king and the saint to 
survive their conflicts with one another as well as the exacting demands of history. 
What might seem static about king/saint relationship, and the cultural constructs 
upon which this relationship rests, resembles in fact the celebration of the circumcision of 
the crown prince at Moulay Idriss Mausoleum. When Mohamed VI was riding a 
decorated horse with his son, and heading towards the mausoleum in the old medina of 
Fez, it seemed as though history was repeating itself. The narrow alleys of the medina 
witnessed the same spectacle over and over again throughout its history which goes back 
to the ninth century. Yet, the spectacle was in fact different.3 The security was 
 
3 The festivities that accompanied the circumcision of the crown prince, and the profuse discourse 
generated about these festivities, recall Mona Ozouf’s remark that “a society which expatiates upon 
festivals has no longer but impoverished versions of it in private merrymaking, and degraded ones in a neo-
folklore entrusted with maintaining a false collective memory.” See her La Fete Revolutionnaire: 1789-
1799 (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 17. Ozouf made this remark in the context of her reinterpretation of the role 
of festivals in the French revolution. The festivities accompanying the circumcision of Moulay Al-Hassan 
are instances of neither private merrymaking nor a degraded neo-folklore. Yet, like Ozouf’s festivals, they 
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incomparably tighter than any time before, and the official discourse of the palace, 
despite its infallible formulaic style, was addressed mainly to the islamists this time and 
displayed a noticeable obsession with reifying tradition.  
Similarly, despite the spectacular and enduring presence of baraka and sharifism 
in Moroccan society, these are in fact open cultural constructs that have no stable content 
of their own, although they have always retained a very special symbolic weight in the 
Moroccan imaginaire. The saint and the sharifian king are aware of the versatility of 
these constructs and exploit this versatility to a maximum in their relationship with one 
another. Baraka and sharifism are reified and invested with a particular ideological 
meaning each time they are brought to play. Their symbolic capital alone is not enough to 
determine their operation. In other words, the agents in a specific historical context 
usually decide upon the way sharifism and baraka are to be deployed in order to serve 
their interests best. In the context of the confrontation between Moulay Ismail and Lyusi 
in the seventeenth century, baraka could still be articulated as a physical miracle, and 
sharifism was a matter of bargaining between saint and king. In contemporary Morocco, 
baraka can no longer be translated into miracles, nor can sharifism be a matter of 
bargaining.3 They are now reifications of a cultural tradition whose survival is equated 
with the continuity of the Moroccan nation. It is the king who now decides upon their 
content and operation in the absence of a strong saint who can compete with him for 
defining such cultural constructs.4
are intended to foster a collective memory, in this case, one that guarantees the continuity of a (reimagined) 
past in which saint and king are allied against the islamist.  
3 I mean at the official level, for it might still be so at the popular level.  
4 I am making this point in the context of saint/king relationship. Otherwise, I am aware that the laymen 
formulate their own versions of baraka and sharifism which they employ in their daily social life. 
However, my concern here is with the official discourse and the macro- rather than micro-relations of 
power. 
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These resilient cultural constructs contribute further to the making of a rich and 
complex cultural tradition that inspires multiple courses of action in response to changing 
historical contexts. After the Casablanca attacks, Mohamed VI fell back safely upon this 
tradition. It allowed him to rally his people around a cultural ideal which he carved out of 
a solid but flexible heritage to suit both the need of the people in a time to hardship, as 
well as his own needs as the representative of the sharifian monarchy. As a result, he 
survived a fatal crisis that struck as early as his fourth year in office. Despite the surge of 
Sufism after 9/11, other Arab and Muslim countries do not have such a distinctively and 
peculiarly strong tradition of Sainthood as Morocco does. Consequently, no other Arab or 
Muslim leader would have had the luxury of falling back upon this tradition as 
successfully as Mohamed VI did. 
In view of the fact that the saint and the king stand for the two most salient figures 
in Moroccan history, the relationship between them represents a major field of power in 
Moroccan society. Accordingly, the historically dynamic nature of this relationship, the 
different patterns it followed, and the versatility of the cultural constructs upon which it 
rested, attest to the existence of a rich culture of power in Moroccan society. Complex in 
its allowance for multiple and versatile relations of power, and plural in its predication 
upon different models of power, this culture offers many possibilities of coalition and 
opposition that are not yet exhausted.  
This complex dynamics of power circulation in Morocco is especially worthy of 
notice by Western academics whose eyes have grown used to seeing mostly the 
invariably constant in Islamic societies. Consequently, no room is left for inventiveness 
and creativity in their representation of Islamic history and culture. In the post-9/11 
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context, however, it is the duty of Muslims also to highlight the creative element in their 
cultures and histories, and liberate themselves from the myth of a static Islamic history so 




1- Moulay Slimane’s letter against mawassim and zawaya24 
Praise to God whom we worship through submission and obedience, he who ordered us 
to defend sunna and jama‘a,25 and to preserve the faith of his gracious prophet and 
compassionate elect from loss until the day of judgment, he who meant him as exemplar 
for us. I thank him beyond the ability of language to convey gratitude, and I beseech his 
help with humility and submission. Peace and prayer be upon our lord Mohamed whom 
God has distinguished with intercession on behalf of those who follow his guidance to the 
best of their abilities. 
Oh, people! May God open your hearts to the acceptance of advice, and reform 
through his providence your lives, and employ both the commander and the commanded 
among you in what he approves of! God has entrusted us with overseeing your affairs, 
and obligated you to obey us. He especially warned us against losing you to what is 
forbidden by the Qur’an, sunna, and the consensus of the Islamic ’umma, “O you who 
believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those of you (Muslims) who are in 
authority. (And) if you differ in anything amongst yourselves, refer it to Allah and His 
Messenger, if you believe in Allah and in the Last Day. That is better and more suitable 
for final determination.”26 We, therefore, regret your inadvertence and insensibility, and 
we are concerned that Satan has dominated over you with bida‘. You shall listen to the 
word of God, awaken from your ignorance, purify your faith from the defilement of 
 
24 This letter was meant as a sermon to be delivered by Imams in mosques during the Friday prayer. Abu 
Al-Qassim Azzayani, a political figure, traveler and historian who lived during the reign of Moulay 
Slimane, first recorded it in his Attorjamana Al-Kubra fi Akhbari Al-Ma‘mouri Barran wa Bahran without 
mentioning the year it was written. 
25 Jama‘a literally means a group, but what is most probably meant here is the consensus of religious 
authorities upon a legal issue, which is one of the four usul (sources) of Islamic law. 
26 An-Nisa’, 59. All Qur’anic verses appear in the text in italics. The translated verses are adopted from 
King Fahd Complex’s 1999 (1419 A.H.) edition of the noble Qur’an that contains an English translation of 
its meanings and a commentary.  
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bida‘, and dedicate to the worship of Allah both your secret and overt thoughts. You must 
know that God, out of his graciousness, has made the path of sunna clear for you to 
follow, and censored passions so that you be in control of them, and obligated you to 
observe the precepts of Islam in order to test you. You should, then, listen to his words on 
that and obey, and recognize his favors and contemplate them. You must abandon the 
bida‘ of mawassim about which you are being misled by the people of whims and 
passions. By commending bida‘, those people who call themselves fuqara‘ are 
dispossessing you of your money and religion and introducing to the faith of Allah what 
makes hell their due, “Say (O Mohammad) ‘Shall We tell you the greatest losers in 
respect of (their) deeds? Those whose efforts have been wasted in this life while they 
thought that they were acquiring good by their deeds.”27 All that is an ignominious 
heresy that betrays a base character. It is a practice which violates shari‘a, a devilish 
form of fraud and deception that Satan graces in the eyes of his followers, so that they 
have appointed specific times of the year to spend money in behalf of Satan. The feeble-
minded, the ignorant, and the deceitful, led by heretics of the like of Aissawa and Jilala, 
now anticipate the times of their pleasure and distraction when crowds swarm for satanic 
practices. All that is illicit, and spending money on it is strictly forbidden by shari‘a.
Oh, Muslims! I ask you in the name of Allah: Did Mohamed, peace and prayers 
be upon him, set up a mawssim for Hamza—his uncle and the lord of martyrs? Did Abu 
Bakr set up one for Mohamed, peace and prayers be upon him? Did Omar set up one for 
Abu Bakr? Were mosques turned into sanctuaries or were the tombs of the prophet’s 
glorious companions adorned in the early days of Islam? I warn you against contending 
that you should follow the example of your fathers for that is the claim of infidels, “They 
27 Al-Kahf, 103-104. 
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say: ‘we found our fathers following a certain way and religion and we guide ourselves 
by their footsteps.’”28 Oh, what you are promised! God has denied infidels this claim and 
rebuked them in his holy Qur’an. The sensible is the one who follows the lead of only the 
rightly-guided among his predecessors, and by necessity later-times Muslims cannot be 
more righteous than the worthy early Muslims, “This day, I have perfected your religion 
for you, completed My Favor upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your 
religion.”29 
God cannot be approached through singing and dancing in Islam, and the only 
form of dhikr sanctioned by God and recommended by shari‘a is the one practiced by the 
prophet and that calls for no crowding or raising of voices. This is the sunna of the 
worthy predecessors, and the path of the righteous ones among their successors. He who 
says otherwise is not to be listened to, and he who follows another path is not to be 
followed, “And whoever contradicts and opposes the messenger (Mohamed) after the 
right path has been shown clearly to him, and follows other than the believers’ way, We 
shall keep him in the path he has chosen, and burn him in Hell—what an evil 
destination!”30 “This is my way; I invite unto Allah with sure knowledge, I and whosoever 
follows me.”31 
Oh, servants of God! How can you still practice these bida‘? Do you deem 
yourselves secure against his divine retribution? Do you want to deceive and confuse 
your fellow Muslims? Or is it out of arrogance before he who controls your fates, and 
renunciation of the rulings of he who is your ultimate resort?  
 
28 Az-Zukhruf, 22. 
29 Al-Ma’ida, 3. 
30 An-Nisa’, 115. 
31 Yusuf, 108. 
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Repent and pray, contemplate and reform this situation; for God has punished 
whole communities because they ignored the abominable acts of some their members and 
did not bother to reform them. Wrongdoer, accomplice, and adulator are all doomed for 
their deceit. How could Satan tempt you when you have the word of God between your 
hands? How could he lead you astray when the sunna of the prophet is calling upon you 
to follow the right path? Return to God in repentance, oh people! “And turn in repentance 
and in obedience with true faith to your Lord and submit to Him before the torment 
comes upon you, (and) then you will not be helped.”32 And he who wants to approach 
God through charity should spend his money on those mentioned in the Qur’an, like the 
needy and the sick, “As-Sadaqat [alms] are only for the poor, and those employed to 
collect (the funds), and to attract the hearts of those who have been inclined (towards 
Islam), and to free the captives, and for those in debt, and for Allah’s Cause, and for the 
wayfarer; a duty imposed by Allah. And Allah is All-Knower, All-Wise.”33 You cannot 
approach God through bida‘ and sins, you should rather adopt the ways of the pious and 
the rightly-guided—night prayers, the recitation of the Qur’an, pilgrimage, jihad, 
judicious advice, trustworthiness, fast, adopting the manners and morals of the Qur’an, 
and avoiding the sites of sins, “And verily, this is My Straight Path, so follow it, and 
follow not (other) paths, for they will separate you away from His Path. This He has 
ordained for you that you may become Al-Muttaqun (the pious).”34 The rightful path of 
the Qur’an and sunna is very far from the path followed by those who meet to raise flags 
and spend nights together in the presence of women and youths. By so doing, they violate 
the rules of shari‘a and introduce bida‘ and vile innovations to the religion, “Is he, then,
32 Az-Zumar, 54. 
33 At-Taubah, 60. 
34 Al-An‘am, 153. 
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to whom the evil of his deeds is made fair-seeming, so that he considers it as good (equal 
to one who is rightly-guided)?”35 
It is, therefore, incumbent upon those whom God has endowed with power and 
authority among you to prevent these sects from attending mosques. All those who 
believe in God and the Day of Judgment are forbidden to attend the meetings of these 
sects or to assist them in their deceitful practices. I warn you against bida‘ for they 
weaken religion. Moreover, ignoring the spread of vile practices causes rules to wither. It 
is well-known in the tradition that when bida‘ gain ground among a people, they are 
struck with God’s wrath, and surrounded with evils from all sides, calamities afflict their 
lands, their waters dry, their enemies prevail, epidemics spread, their cattle die, and the 
baraka of their crops decreases. Irreverence towards God opens the door to calamities. 
(…) 
 Bear witness, oh Muslims, that we have warned and guided you! Any one who 
still attends mawassim or introduces a bid‘a to the shari‘a of Mohamed will court trouble 
and destruction for both his community and himself, and will lose both this world and the 
Hereafter, “He loses both this world and the Hereafter. That is the evident loss,”36 “And 
let those who oppose the Messenger’s commandment beware, lest some fitnah should 
befall them or a painful torment be inflicted on them.”37 
35 Fatir, 8. 
36 Al-Hajj, 11. 
37 An-Nur, 63. 
57
2- King Mohamed the Sixth’s letter to the Sidi Shikr International  
Sufi Conference (2004) 
 
Praise be to Allah and peace and blessings be upon our lord, the Messenger of Allah, his 
kin and kith. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, 
We insisted to sponsor this first meeting of the International Sidi Shikr Sufi Conference 
out of our sense of duty as Prince of the Faithful and overseer of the religious affairs in 
our kingdom in all their dimensions and manifestations. It is a pleasure to address you 
today and to welcome you to a country that is associated in your memory with an 
important Sufi heritage whose pivots are well known in the rest of the Islamic world.  
The people of this good land were aware, since their embracing of Islam, that the 
essence of faith is the purification of the soul from selfishness, grudge, and bigotry (…) 
and the exercise of self-control and supervision of daily behavior, for the attainment of 
the kind of spiritual perfection that is termed Sufism. Throughout the centuries, many 
Sufi turuq were founded in Morocco by pious, sensible, high-minded, exemplary sheikhs. 
Those turuq became spiritual and religious schools that served Islam by consolidating its 
highest values, strengthening its foundations, and adapting it to different times and 
places. They educated people through different rural and urban zawaya many of which 
still exist today. Our predecessors the kings, God bless their souls, used to address the 
sheikhs of these zawaya in letters as murabitin out of reverence for the Holy Qur’an and 
the sharifian sunna. One of the meanings of murabata is retirement for worship with the 
ultimate aim of refining the human soul, and that is the best form of jihad.
(…) 
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The contemplation of the history of Sufism in Morocco reveals that Moroccan 
Sufis, from all social classes, just like their counterparts elsewhere, possessed refined 
characters and displayed much erudition in the study of the Qur’an. Yet, Moroccan Sufis 
are distinct thanks to their social and educational commitment. They taught the Qur’an 
and established an approach that talks to the heart and strengthens its faith in the all-
encompassing mercy of God. They fostered the people’s love for Mohamed’s kin, 
founded schools and libraries, reconciled enemies, popularized the values of reciprocity, 
solidarity, and cooperation. They also weaved webs of communication between different 
tribes, and thus abolished ethnic and tribal discrimination. Moreover, they helped to 
abolish many manifestations of social seclusion by urging people to compete for 
charitable causes, and renounce the material for the spiritual. Since it is impossible to 
cover here all aspects of their social and educational involvement, we would like to 
highlight three aspects of this involvement that are worthy of special notice: 1- the 
support and assistance of the Imama in carrying out its duties, 2- the purification of souls 
from power-thirst, selfishness, and tyranny, and 3- the upbringing of (Sufi) leaders whose 
universal aspirations did not clash with their nationalistic feelings.  
Distinguished ladies and gentleman, 
We are in dire need today for reviving the values of tolerance, solidarity, and 
altruism. Muslims especially need to revive their noble values of co-existing and 
cooperating with the Other. When we invoke the great mystics and salihs and reminisce 
about their white hands upon Islamic civilization, we long to drinking from the pure 
sources of their values and exalted qualities. After all, what is inspired by the Qur’an and 
sunna cannot be looked upon as a rigid, frozen heritage, or an outdated tradition. 
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Educational effort that is aimed at refining the individual is the ideal in all times and 
places; for God endowed human beings and qualified them to seek perfection in 
themselves, their communities, and their environment.  
(…) 
 Certainly, your Sufi heritage qualifies you to return to the religious, social, and 
educational fields in a way that rises above any political exploitation thanks to the true 
values of Sufism that couple piety, upright behavior and truthful disinterested social 
work. Societies today are fostering tolerance and many of the other values of the Sufi 
culture. You should preserve these values and emblematize communication and 
cooperation among yourselves in order to foreground the spirit of your meeting in a 
country that has remained a pivot of religious tolerance. This country is determined to go 
on the path of moderation, to remain faithful at all times to its cultural foundations, to 
constantly observe the values of openness and reciprocity, and to profess the necessity of 
cooperation between individuals, communities, cultures, and civilizations. 
May God unify your turuq in Sufism upon the Right Path, and free you from all worldly 
attachments, a freedom that enables the exalted deeds which soothe hearts, cause 
communities to thrive, and benefit the Islamic ’umma.





‘alim: (pl. ‘ulama’) literally, “a person of knowledge,” a Muslim religious scholar. 
 
bas: affliction of any sort (illness, drought, epidemics, etc…). 
 
bid‘a: innovation in the Islamic religion that has no source in the Qur’an or sunna.              
 
dhikr: generally refers to the repetition of certain words and phrases in praise of God. In    
Sufi rituals, it refers to the rhythmic chanting of God’s divine names and phrases of 
praise (also sama‘) so as to bring about a state of meditation or ecstasy (al-hal). 
 
hadith: the sayings of the prophet Mohamed. 
 
harka: a military expedition organized by the sultan for punitive or fiscal purposes. 
faqih: a legist, someone learned in Islamic law. 
 
fatwa: a formal legal opinion given by a Muslim religious scholar. 
fitna: sedition, internal strife, anarchy, political or social disorder, female beauty. In 
general, all that can distract the Muslim community from pursuing its highest aims, bring 
about its disunity and thus weaken it. 
 
fuqara’: (sg. faqir) literally, the poor ones. In the saintly tradition, it refers to the adepts 
of a saintly order regardless of their financial status. 
 
’imama: the religious leadership of the Muslim community, in the case of Morocco, the 
sharifian monarchy.
madrasa: a religious school. 
 
makhzen: the Moroccan central government. 
 
marabout: a French rendition of the Arabic term murabit. Originally, it referred to a rural 
holy man, but it is now used as a generic name for the North-African saint. 
 
shari‘a: Islamic law. 
 
sharif: a descendent of the prophet Mohamed. 
 
sheikh: literally, the elder, the chief. In the Sufi tradition, the master of a Sufi order. 
 
s-siba: an organized form of political dissension practiced by the Atlas Berber tribes in 
order to maintain their autonomy with regard to the makhzen.
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sunna: the sayings and deeds of the prophet Mohamed, the collective body of prophetic 
traditions. 
 
‘urf: customary law. 
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